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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper relies on literature review and primary data 
collected through interviews to examine the political 
economy of the cocoa value chain in Ghana, since 
the colonial era. The analysis, which was based 
on the political settlements framework, has shown 
that policies implemented in Ghana’s cocoa value 
chain have gone through several shifts in relation to 
changing agrarian political economy and distribution 
of power among various interest groups. Various 
policies and institutional arrangements have created 
different costs and benefits (rents) for different interest 
groups in the cocoa sector. 
Policy development in the cocoa sector went 
through four periods. First was the colonial period 
which experienced a fairly corporate governance 
system and struggle between European traders 
and farmer cooperatives for monopoly over internal 
marketing of cocoa. This was followed by the 
early post-independence era (1957–1980), which 
witnessed a state-controlled economy, characterised 
by neopatrimonialism and over-taxation of cocoa 
farmers through the fixing of producer prices far lower 
than the world market prices. The third period (1980–
2000) marks the introduction of economic reforms 
and liberalisation which were adopted in response to 
international pressure and economic crisis. Although 
the economic reforms contributed to the revival of the 
cocoa sector, it also increased the cost of production 
to farmers and created further rents for political elite 
and their clients. The fourth period (2000–present) 
saw increased public-private partnerships aimed 
at reducing rural poverty, empowering women and 
youth in the cocoa sector, protecting the rights of 
children, and promoting environmentally friendly 
farming activities. However, only entrepreneurs in 
the patronage networks of the ruling governments 
are benefiting from such public-private partnerships. 
There is also no evidence that the recent public-
private partnerships have resulted in better outcomes 
for women, children, and the youth. 
We conclude that, although liberalisation of the value 
chain was enforced onto Ghana by international 
development partners, the government of Ghana has 
relied on policy ambiguities to maintain its autonomy 
and control over the lucrative cocoa marketing sector. 
Successive governments have justified the state’s 
monopoly over internal marketing of cocoa and cocoa 
export in terms of the need to ensure the continuous 
supply of high quality of cocoa products. While over-
taxation of farmers was the main mechanism of 
creating rent in the early post-independence era, recent 
governments have been distributing such rents through 
the procurement and distribution of subsidised inputs, 
and by awarding donor grants to crony capitalists. 
The paper also concludes that, while Ghana’s cocoa 
sector is in a good position and has the potential to 
continue to contribute to economic development, 
there is a need for the government to work with various 
stakeholders to address various challenges, which 
include: tenure insecurities, inadequate labour supply, 
lack of accessible credit, shortage of farm inputs, 
high levels of poverty among smallholder farmers, 
climate change, and COVID-19. Given that rent-
seeking behaviour is also a threat to the sustainability 
of the sector, we also urge international development 
partners and civil society groups to demand greater 
accountability and transparency from the political elite 
and state institutions in the cocoa sector.  
Keywords: Cocoa, value chain, political economy, 
political settlements, Ghana
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This paper examines the political economy dynamics 
of the cocoa value chain in Ghana, the world’s second 
largest producer of cocoa (Glavee-Geo et al. 2020; 
Roldan et al. 2013). Commercial cultivation of cocoa 
in Ghana has a long history, dating back to 1879 when 
Tetteh Quarshie, a Ghanaian blacksmith, brought the 
amelonado cocoa pod from Fernado Po in Equatorial 
Guinea (Amoah 1995). Tetteh Quarshie planted the 
cocoa seed, at Mampong Akuapem in the Eastern 
Region of the then Gold Coast, and later started selling 
the early pods from his trees to other farmers who 
cultivated cocoa on their lands. Within a few years, 
the cultivation of cocoa spread to other villages in the 
Eastern Region and then to other regions by word of 
mouth. Farmers’ interest in the cultivation of cocoa 
was shaped by declining world market prices of oil 
palm which used to be one of the main export crops 
cultivated in the then Gold Coast (Amanor et al. 2020). 
While the initial cocoa production was largely driven 
by personal investments made by individual farmers, 
the British colonial administration made a modest 
contribution to the development of the cocoa sector 
through the provision of extension services to farmers, 
and expansion of road infrastructure to the cocoa 
growing areas of the then Gold Coast (Amoah 1995). 
Ghana became the world’s leading cocoa producer 
in 1910/11 and held this position until 1976/77. While 
the Ghanaian cocoa sector experienced a significant 
downturn from the late 1960s to the early 1980s 
as a result of a combination of factors, including a 
decline in cocoa prices on the world market, effects 
of pests and diseases, and political instability (Löwe 
2017), the cocoa sector recovered again in the mid-
1980s after the adoption of Economic Recovery and 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (Amanor et al. 
2020; Kolavalli and Vigneri 2017). 
The cocoa sector has, historically, been the backbone 
of the Ghanaian economy. Several households in 
Ghana depend directly on the cocoa sector for 
livelihoods, and aspects of the cocoa industry, such 
as input supplies to farmers and cocoa pricing, have 
historically featured prominently in national and local 
politics (Teye and Torvikey 2018). However, there are 
very few studies on the interests and benefits that 
accrue to various actors of the cocoa value chain in 
Ghana. As part of the Agricultural Policy Research 
in Africa (APRA) Programme, this paper relies on the 
political settlements framework (Khan 2018) to examine 
the basic underlying political economy dynamics of the 
cocoa value chain, with particular focus on how the 
interests, powers and interactions of various actors 
along the value chain have contributed to agricultural 
commercialisation in Ghana. The paper also explores 
the challenges affecting the cocoa value chain, social 
difference within the chain, and how various segments 
of the cocoa value chain have been affected by the 
COVID-19 pandemic in Ghana since March 2020. 
The paper is structured into five sections. Section 2 
presents theoretical perspectives that will be relied 
upon for the analysis as well as the methods of data 
collection. Section 3 presents the political importance 
and performance of the cocoa sector. Section 4 
maps the various actors in the cocoa value chain 
and discusses the outcomes of policies in the cocoa 
sector, within the framework of the political settlements 
theory. The section also discusses current and 
emerging challenges facing the cocoa sector, including 
COVID-19. Section 5 presents the conclusions and 
policy recommendations.
1 INTRODUCTION
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This section discusses the approach to value chain 
analysis adopted for this study, and explains the 
political settlement theory which will be used to 
discuss the findings of the study. The section also 
describes the method of data collection.
2.1. Value chain analysis
The concept of value chain, which is attributed to 
Porter (1985), simply describes the set of activities 
within and around production to create value for an 
organisation (Asamoah and Annan 2012). The concept 
assumes value addition as a product moves from one 
stage of production to another (Zamora 2016). Value 
chain analysis is a useful tool for assessing the role 
that specific value chains can play in achieving specific 
policy objectives, such as promoting economic 
growth, alleviating poverty, and reducing inequality 
(Bellù and Pansini 2009). According to Bellù (2013:1), 
Value Chain Analysis (VCA) is “the assessment of a 
portion of an economic system where upstream 
agents in production and distribution processes are 
linked to downstream partners by technical, economic, 
territorial, institutional and social relationships”. 
A value chain begins with the production of a 
commodity, and ends with the consumption of the 
final product (Asamoah and Annan 2012). According to 
Bellù (2013) value chain analysis is expected to focus 
on the following domains: (a) Socio-economic context 
of the value chain; (b) demand for value outputs to 
identify the threats and opportunities associated with 
the value chain; (c) analysis of the institutional set-up 
to understand interactions among various agents; (d) 
examination of input and output markets; (e) functional 
analysis of the value chain to understand the sequence 
of operations relating to commodity production, 
processing, marketing, and final consumption; and (f) 
economic analysis of the value chain to understand 
the value added creation and distribution processes. 
In this paper, some of the domains that are similar 
will be combined. We start with an examination of the 
socio-economic context of the value chain, followed 
by an analysis of the final market and demand for 
value outputs. The next section of the assessment 
will focus on evolution of policies in the sector, and 
the institutional set-up and functional analysis of the 
value chain. This is based on the political settlement 
conceptual framework, which is outlined in the next 
sub-section.
2.2. The political settlements 
framework
 
The political settlements framework emerged as a 
critique of theoretical perspectives that do not pay 
attention to the formal and informal relations that 
characterise policy development. The framework 
suggests that the distribution of power among various 
interest groups determines the outcomes of public 
policies (Whitfield et al. 2015). Any public policy 
generates different costs and benefits (rents) for 
different groups (Khan 2018). Different groups may 
therefore employ various strategies to influence policy 
formulation and allocation of rents. Various groups 
may support or resist policies depending on their own 
interests and capabilities (Whitfield et al. 2015). Actual 
policy outcomes may thus depend on several factors, 
including the distribution of power among various 
interest groups. Policies that threaten the rents of 
powerful interest groups are unlikely to be adopted, 
even if they are socially desirable (Khan 2018). The 
framework also suggests that political parties tend 
to capture resources for their clients who can help 
them remain in power, even though such activities 
may damage the economy (Behuria et al. 2017). The 
political settlement theory therefore suggests that 
any analysis of policy outcomes must focus on the 
interests and distribution of power among competing 
groups. The theory further explains that the holding 
power of interest groups is based on a combination 
of economic capabilities, capacity of their leadership 
to mobilise resources, and their skill in rewarding the 
right policy actors through formal or informal networks 
(Khan 2018; Whitfield et al. 2015). Groups that lose out 
during the formulation of stated policy may continue 
to mobilise resources, and adopt several strategies to 
influence subsequent policy changes in their favour. 
Policy changes are usually the outcome of interactions 
between policymakers and interest groups. The 
theory also suggests that while interest groups in 
developed countries often try to lobby policymakers to 
change formal rules which are enforced by legitimate 
2 THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND 
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governance agencies, powerful interest groups in 
developing countries tend to adopt informal violations 
of formal rules to capture benefits informally (Khan 
2018). Patronage networks and corruption, which 
distort policy outcomes in developing countries, are 
therefore explained as part of the political settlement. 
In summary, the theory argues that instead of only 
focusing on formal rules, there is a need to examine 
how the interests of policymakers and powerful 
actors shape the formulation and implementation of 
policies (Behuria et al. 2017; Whitfield 2015). Based 
on this framework, we will examine the performance 
of the cocoa sector through a historical analysis of 
the changes in interests and distribution of powers of 
various actors in the cocoa value chain in Ghana.
2.3. Research methodology 
The paper is based on a combination of secondary 
and primary data. The study commenced with a 
comprehensive review of literature on the cocoa 
value chain in Ghana. Apart from providing useful 
background information on the performance of the 
cocoa sector, the literature review provided information 
that is useful for the mapping of the cocoa value chain. 
The review also enhanced our understanding of the 
interests of various policy actors as well as the policies 
and regulations that govern the cocoa value chain. The 
review of the scientific literature was complemented 
with secondary data sources which provided 
information on the performance of the cocoa value 
chain. The secondary data includes data on annual 
output of cocoa and contribution of the cocoa to the 
economy. Primary data was collected to complement 
the secondary data. The approach to primary data 
collection and data analysis was largely qualitative. In 
all, 21 knowledgeable actors in the cocoa value chain 
were interviewed as key informants. They were selected 
from the private sector, government, cocoa producer 
associations and academia. Flexible interview guides 
were used to interview all respondents. The topics 
covered in the interviews include the structure of the 
cocoa value chain; performance of the cocoa sector; 
evolution of policies in the cocoa value chain; interests 
and holding power of different actors, and how these 
influence policy and outcomes. Some of the key 
informants who are involved in the cocoa value chain 
also answered questions on the impact of COVID-19 on 
their agribusinesses. These interviews were based on 
a rapid market survey questionnaire jointly designed by 
the leaders of the APRA and Commercial Agriculture 
for Smallholders and Agribusiness research teams.
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This section examines the political and economic 
importance of the cocoa value chain in Ghana, and 
discusses history of the performance and economic 
importance of the cocoa sector. 
3.1. Economic and political 
importance of the cocoa value chain 
The agricultural sector contributes about 20 per cent to 
Ghana’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employs 
42 per cent of the economically active population 
(GSS 2016). Of the four major sub-sectors – crops, 
animals, fisheries, and forestry – the crop sub-sector 
is the most economically important (Yaro et al. 2017). 
The cocoa sector contributes significantly to socio-
economic development in Ghana, especially in terms 
of its contributions to GDP, foreign exchange, and 
employment. Although the sector’s contribution to 
GDP has declined in the last decade (see Table 3.1), it is 
still the most important commercial crop, contributing 
an average of 2 per cent to GDP in the last decade.
The cocoa sector is also important source of foreign 
exchange for Ghana (Deans et al. 2018). In the 1970s, 
65 per cent of the country’s foreign earning came 
from export of cocoa.  Today, Ghana is the second 
leading exporter of cocoa to the United States, Europe 
and Asia (Glavee-Geo et al. 2020; Monastyrnaya et 
al. 2016). Cocoa currently contributes 80 per cent of 
agricultural export earnings (ISSER 2017). As shown 
in Figure 3.1, the total value of export increased from 
GH¢ 878.86 million in 2000 to GH¢ 87,432.98 million 
in 2019. A greater proportion of the cocoa foreign 
exchange comes from export of cocoa beans. Table 
3 IMPORTANCE AND PERFORMANCE OF 
THE COCOA VALUE CHAIN 
Table 3.1: Contribution of cocoa and other sectors to gross domestic product 






2000 48.81 21.25 29.94  19.96  2.63  4.37  2.99  
2001 49.20  21.01 29.80  19.84  2.64  4.39  2.92  
2002 49.26  21.04  29.70  19.77  2.65  4.41  2.87  
2003 48.58  20.81  30.61  20.80  2.62  4.41  2.79  
2004 47.88  20.37  31.75  22.03  2.58  4.34  2.80  
2005 48.12  20.65 31.23  21.79 2.53  4.31  2.60  
2006 48.80  20.80 30.40  21.30  3.02  2.45  4.13  2.52  
2007 50.20  20.75 29.05  20.27  2.67  2.30  4.18  2.30  
2008 48.61  20.42 30.96  22.45  2.46  2.12  3.74  2.66  
2009 49.19  19.00 31.81  23.63  2.45  2.04  3.68  2.45  
2010 51.13  19.12 29.75  21.71  3.21  2.01  3.72  2.31  
2011 49.10  25.56 25.34  19.07  3.57  1.80  2.77  1.70  
2012 49.13  28.02 22.85  17.17  2.56  1.59  2.58  1.51  
2013 49.79  27.81 22.40  17.43  2.19  1.35  2.24  1.38  
2014 51.94  26.56 21.50  16.75  2.22  1.22  2.34  1.18  
2015 54.37  25.35 20.28  15.74  2.21 1.16  2.28  1.10  
2016 46.90 30.20 22.80 16.2  1.93  3.3  1.8  1.4  
2017 47.70 30.30 22.00 15.4  1.80  3.0  1.7  1.2  
2018 48.20 31.40 20.50 14.5  1.60 2.7  1.5  1.0  
2019 49.50 31.10 19.40 13.8  1.40 2.5  1.3  0.9  
Source: Adapted by authors from data provided by Ghana Statistical Service 2020
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3.2 demonstrates the value of raw cocoa beans 
exported has increased from GH¢1,211 million in 2010 
to GH¢10,147 million in 2015. Export of cocoa beans 
and cocoa products contributes more than 30 per 
cent of the value of merchandise export (GIPC 2017). 
Cocoa contributes to the livelihood of about six million 
people that are heavily dependent on the cocoa sector, 
including over 800,000 mostly rural households that 
derive 67 per cent or more of their household income 
(Asamoah and Owusu-Ansah 2017; ISSER 2014). 
Cocoa exports are subject to taxes which provides 
government with revenue from cocoa, while the tax 
rate on exports of cocoa beans is fixed annually by the 
government. Currently, about 5 per cent of government 
revenue comes from cocoa export tax alone. 
3.2. Historical analysis of the performance 
of the cocoa sector 
Ghana’s cocoa sector performed very well in the late 
nineteenth and early twenty-first centuries (Manu 
1974). The evidence for this claim is the fact that 
Ghana became the world’s leading producer of cocoa 
in 1910/11, barely 30 years after the commencement 
of commercial production of cocoa. While this early 
performance of the cocoa sector is often attributed 
to massive investments made by smallholder farmers 
and migrant capitalist farmers who have invested in 
land purchase and cocoa production (Hill 1963), the 
British colonial administration also played a small 
contribution to the development of the early cocoa 
industry in Ghana. For instance, in 1886, Sir William 
Brandford Griffith, the then Governor of the Gold 
Coast, supported the cultivation of cocoa by importing 
cocoa pods from Sao Tome and planting them at a 
newly state established botanical garden at Aburi. 
The seedlings produced at Aburi were subsequently 
distributed through the local chiefs and Basel 
missionaries to farmers in areas suitable for cocoa 
production (Amoah 1995). The colonial administration 
also contributed to the development of the cocoa 
sector through research and extension services. For 
instance, the administration established the Cocoa 
Research Institute of Ghana at Tafo in 1938 (Amanor 
et al. 2020). Another mechanism by which the colonial 
government promoted the growth of the cocoa sector 
was through the development of infrastructure, such 
as roads and railways, in the cocoa producing areas. 
According to Akwabi-Ameyaw (1973:183), four cocoa 
growing settlements, Asankare, Juaso, Konongo and 
Bomfa, in Eastren Ashanti had been linked by rail with 
Table 3.2. Ghana’s major exports (in GH¢ million)
Mining 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Gold (bullion) 3,341.1 5,111.7 8,947.7 8,155.8 12,416.8 14,605.0 
Unwrought gold 539.4 1,395.2 2,338.3 2,106.8 416.9 1,183.6 
Agriculture 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Cocoa beans 1,211.1 3,127.7 3,530.4 2,694.3 5,787.4 10,146.6 
Cashew nuts 19.1 709.4 273.0 454.0 293.9 1,069.1 
Cocoa products 986.6 1,324.8 1,320.4 1,149.3 1,897.1 
Source: Ghana Statistical Service (2016, as cited by GIPC 2017)































2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Year
Source: Author’s calculation 
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the Accra and Sekindi coastal ports by 1923. The 
colonial government also promoted the marketing of 
cocoa by establishing a well-controlled marketing, input 
subsidy programmes and pricing regime for cocoa. 
Compared with other farmers, cocoa farmers were 
given better support in terms of inputs and guaranteed 
prices. As a result of early investments, Ghana’s cocoa 
sector performed very well and cocoa output grew 
exponentially from 1900 to 1938 (see Figure 3.2).
The cocoa industry, however, became stagnant 
between 1938 and 1960, as a result of a decline in 
price of cocoa on the world market and an outbreak 
of diseases and pests, especially the swollen shoot 
virus (Frankel 1974). The early post-independence 
era (1961–1964) witnessed a rise in the performance 
of the cocoa sector again and this was attributed to 
high prices offered to farmers, and the fact that trees 
planted a few years earlier had now matured (Vigneri 
and Kolavalli 2017). However, this short period of good 
performance gave way to another long period of poor 
performance. Indeed, the period from 1964–1982 is 
often described as a downturn of the cocoa sector, 
as total annual output declined significantly (see Figure 
3.2). While Ghana produced about 40 per cent of the 
world’s cocoa in the early 1930s, it contributed just 
about 10 per cent of total global output in the 1970s 
and 1980s (Löwe 2017; Knudsen 2010). This poor 
performance of the sector was partly caused by a 
decline in cocoa prices on the world market, which 
prompted the Ghana Cocoa Board (COCOBOD) to 
Table 3.3: Growth rates in various sectors of the Ghanaian economy 2006 to 2019






2007 6.5  7.3  5.7  6.7 8.7 4.7 2.6 3.6
2007 7.7  6.1  -1.7  -1.3 -8.2 4.7 -4.1 -7.2
2008 8.0. 15.1. 7.4. 8.6 3.2 5.1 -3.3 17.4
2009 5.6 4.5 7.2 10.2 5.0 4.4 0.7 -5.7
2010 9.8  6.9  5.3  5.0 26.6 4.6 10.1 1.5
2011 9.4  41.6  0.8  3.7 14.0 5.1 -14.0 -8.7
2012 12.1  11.0  2.3  0.8 -9.5 5.2 6.8 9.1
2013 10.0  6.6  5.7  5.9 2.6 5.3 4.6 5.7
2014 5.6  0.8  4.6  5.7 4.3 5.3 3.8 -5.6
2015 5.7  1.2  2.4  2.0 -2.3 5.3 3.8 1.2
2016 46.7  30.6  2.9  16.2  2.2  3.3  1.8  1.4  
2017 46.0  32.7  6.1  15.4  7.2  3.0  1.7  1.2  
2018 46.3  34.0  4.8  14.5  5.8  2.7  1.5  1.0  
2019 47.2  34.2  4.6  13.8  5.3  2.5  1.3  0.9  
Source: Adapted by authors based on administrative data provided by Ghana Statistical services 




















































































































Source: Polly Hill 1956; Kotey et al. 1973; Ghana Cocoa Board
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reduce the producer price given to farmers. Farmers 
responded to this situation of lower returns by 
reducing investment in cocoa production (Amanor et 
al. 2020). Political instability, high level of corruption, 
and diseases and pests also accounted for the 
decline in cocoa output during this period. The cocoa 
industry recovered again since 1983, as a result of the 
implementation of economic recovery and structural 
adjustment programmes (ERP/SAPs).
The main components of the ERP/SAPs which propelled 
the recovery and growth of the cocoa sector were 
increased producer prices, improved infrastructure, 
reduction of implicit taxation of farmers and improved 
extension services to farmers (Vigneri and Kolavalli 
2013). Since the 1990s, the government and its 
development partners have promoted increasing use 
of hybrid crop varieties, fertilisers, and chemicals, and 
this has also contributed to the rising quantity of cocoa 
harvested in Ghana (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2017). The 
significant rise in cocoa output, especially since 2000, 
is attributed to rising world market prices of cocoa 
and COCOBOD’s input support to cocoa farmers, 
including mass spraying of cocoa farms and provision 
of high subsidised fertilisers (Amanor et al. 2020). As 
shown in Table 3.3, the average growth rate in the 
cocoa sector has been around 4 per cent in the last 
3 years. A very high growth rate of 26.6 per cent was 
recorded in 2010.
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In this section, we examine the various domains of the 
cocoa value chain, based on the conceptual framework 
outlined earlier. The section will also examine social 
difference and challenges facing the chain, including 
the impact of COVID-19. 
4.1. Final market and demand for   
Ghana’s cocoa 
As hinted already, Ghana supplies a greater proportion 
of its cocoa to the world market, and is currently 
the second leading exporter of cocoa to the United 
States, Europe and Asia (Glavee-Geo et al. 2020). The 
European Union market is by far the most important 
for the bulk of Ghana’s cocoa products (COCOBOD 
2016). The prices of exported cocoa are determined 
by global prices set on futures markets such as the 
London Cocoa Futures, the ICE Cocoa Futures and 
Euro Cocoa Futures (Grumiller et al. 2018; Oomes 
et al. 2016). The markets for cocoa export, cocoa 
processing, and chocolate production in the value 
chain are increasingly becoming highly concentrated, 
both at country and global levels (Callahan 2019; Ton et 
al. 2008), with ten chocolate manufacturing companies 
accounting for about 43 per cent of global sales (Glavee-
Geo et al. 2020). This has facilitated the penetration of 
more coordinated ‘value chains’, with stronger linkages 
between retailers, chocolate manufacturers and cocoa 
processors. While market concentration increases the 
bargaining power of traders and processors and allows 
them to benefit from economies of scale, smallholder 
farmers barely benefit from any cost savings as they 
are often reduced to “price takers” (Callahan 2019; 
Ton et al. 2008). For instance, in 2008, cocoa farmers 
received only 4 per cent of the final price of an average 
bar of milk chocolate, potentially undermining the 
sustainability of quality cocoa production (Barrientos 
et al. 2008). Oomes et al. (2016), however, argue that 
market concentration is not the key cause of poverty 
among smallholder cocoa farmers, blaming instead 
low productivity among farmers and the lack of 
alternative livelihoods.
Notwithstanding, consumer tastes have become more 
nuanced and differentiated by price and quality with 
greater segmentation in the chocolate market, and 
increasingly many manufacturers and processors 
have become aware of growing consumer concerns 
with social and environmental issues through the 
purchase of higher price organic and Fairtrade-
certified chocolate (Yihdego et al. 2019; Barrientos et 
al. 2008). This growing demand is raising concerns 
about the future resilience of the supply chains of the 
chocolate industry to secure sufficient quality cocoa to 
meet this demand, especially when industry specialists 
are forecasting a possible shortage of cocoa in 2020 
(Barrientos and Bobie 2016). A potential disequilibrium 
is therefore emerging in the supply and demand of 
quality cocoa beans, particularly for the high-quality 
niche and mainstream-quality segments of the market. 
This prospect is complicated by adverse media 
pressure regarding the use of child and forced labour 
on cocoa farms in West Africa. Children’s work on 
cocoa plantations went unnoticed by consumers and 
industry actors until The New York Times’ publication 
on “bonded labour” in 2001 (Löwe 2017). The ensuing 
consumer protests and boycotts heightened industry 
concerns. In recent years, issues of forced labour 
and Worst Forms of Child Labour Conventions have 
featured prominently in the cocoa industry, especially 
in developing countries.
Several certification schemes by the Universal Trade 
Zone, Fairtrade and Rainforest Alliance now ensure 
that farmers get premiums for higher-quality beans 
and buyers benefit from enhanced supply security, 
brand reputation, credibility of claims and transparency 
of the supply chain (Grumiller et al. 2018). In response, 
several companies have introduced corporate social 
responsibility initiatives, including the promotion of 
women’s empowerment in support programmes 
for cocoa farming. Manufacturers are increasingly 
demanding high-quality cocoa produced in accordance 
with international social and environmental standards 
(Barrientos et al. 2008). Ghana is uniquely advantaged 
to continue to produce high-quality cocoa that meets 
these international standards (Asamoah and Annan 
2012). COCOBOD, which functions as the state ‘buyer 
of last resort’, provides support to farmers and ensures 
the maintenance of the highest-quality standards 
of final exports (Knudsen 2010). This has helped to 
maintain the quality of Ghanaian cocoa which earns 
an international price premium (Sulaiman and Boachie-
Danquah 2017; Monastyrnaya et al. 2016). More 
4 ASSESSMENT OF THE MAIN DOMAINS 
OF THE COCOA VALUE CHAIN 
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importantly, Ghana’s high-quality cocoa, traceability 
and contract integrity has meant that it has been able 
to sell a larger percentage of its cocoa than other 
producer countries on forward markets. This helps to 
cushion farmers against price volatility in the markets, 
which ensures sustainability of high-quality cocoa 
production. The future demand for Ghana’s cocoa 
will continue to be high. Ghana can expand within the 
mainstream quality segment of the cocoa market as 
an important exporter of Fairtrade cocoa (Joerin et al. 
2018), with potential to expand niche markets such as 
Fairtrade and organic chocolate (Yihdego et al. 2019). 
For instance, Cadbury, which purchases most of its 
cocoa from Ghana, is rewarded for the premium it 
pays by occupying the mainstream-quality range of the 
consumer market. Cadbury thus has a strong interest 
in supporting Ghana’s position as a high-quality cocoa 
producer in the future.
4.2 Mapping Ghana’s cocoa value chain: 
institutional set-up and chain actors 
Studies of the cocoa value chain in Ghana identify five 
to six stages, including input supply by both state and 
private agents; cocoa bean production by smallholder 
farmers; purchasing and transport of cocoa beans by 
state and private licensed buying companies (LBCs); 
cocoa bean processing to paste, butter and powder; 
further processing of the intermediate products by 
combining several inputs; manufacturing of chocolate 
products by chocolate makers, dairies and bakers; 
and distribution and sales by retailers (Tardzenyuy et 
al. 2020; Yihdego et al. 2019; Grumiller et al. 2018). 
According to Monastyrnaya et al. (2016), the actors in 
the cocoa value chain may be designated as public 
(with COCOBOD as a typical example); formal, or those 
regulated by the state through contractual agreements 
(e.g. LBCs, processors and big food retailers); and 
informal. These include unregulated actors consisting 
of small private businesses dealing in inputs, food 
retailing and haulage activities, and agribusiness, 
including the activities of smallholder farmers (see Table 
4.1). Notwithstanding the intricate linkages between 
internal and external activities of the cocoa value chain, 
the majority of studies focus attention on the internal 
matters of the chain (Grumiller et al. 2018; Joerin et 
al. 2018; Monastyrnaya et al. 2016). Very few studies 
(Asante-Poku and Angelucci 2013) have captured both 
the internal and external dynamics of the cocoa value 
chain in Ghana and effectively linked the country to the 
global cocoa value chain.
4.2.1. Input supply  
The cocoa value chain in Ghana begins with inputs, 
such as seedlings, agrochemicals and farming 
equipment supplied by both state and private suppliers 
(Hütz-Adams et al. 2016; Monastyrnaya et al. 2016). 
The management of input supply has changed over 
the years, and while the state provided subsidised 
fertilisers and agrichemicals in the early post-
independence era, the subsidies were withdrawn in 
early 1980s when the state adopted ERPs. They were, 
however, re-introduced in the mid–2000s partly as a 
result of the desire to use input supply to win political 
votes (see Teye and Torvikey 2018). 
Table 4.1: Main cocoa value chain actors in Ghana
Activity Actor Outputs Type of sector
Input supply Private Input dealers Seeds, fertilisers, agro-chemicals Mainly informal
CHED, SPD (COCOBOD) Public
Production Farmers Cocoa beans Agribusiness
Internal marketing LBCs Purchasing of cocoa beans 
from farmers and delivery to 
COCOBOD
Formal
Transportation LBCs Transportation of cocoa beans Formal
Hauliers Transportation of cocoa beans Mainly informal
Exports CMC (COCOBOD) Exporting of cocoa beans Public
Processing Processors Chocolate, cocoa powder, cocoa 
butter, liquor, cakes, beverages 
Mainly informal
Marketing of cocoa 
waste
Cocoa waste companies Exporting of inferior cocoa and 
cocoa waste
Formal
Retail Big supermarkets Delivering products to consumers Mainly formal
Small retailers Formal
Individual distributers and 
table-top businesses
Mainly formal
Source: Monastyrnaya et al. 2016
15Working Paper 053 | March 2021
Several studies have shown that increasing cocoa 
yields in Ghana are attributable to the adaptation of 
new technology in the industry that involved the use 
of chemical fertilisers, hybrid cocoa trees and greater 
pests and disease control (Löwe 2017; Kolavalli and 
Vigneri 2017). For instance, compared to the 1980s 
when only 10 per cent of trees were of high-yielding 
varieties, and 1990, when only 10 per cent of farmers 
applied fertiliser, in 2002, 57 per cent of farmers used 
high-yielding varieties and 50 per cent applied fertiliser 
(Löwe 2017). The state acting through COCOBOD’s 
Seed Production Division (SPD) and the Cocoa Health 
and Extension Division (CHED), supplies inputs such 
as seedlings and fertilisers to cocoa farmers, and 
conducts mass spraying on cocoa farms (Manteaw 
et al. 2018). Meanwhile, many small-scale private 
input dealers, typically located in various urban and 
peri-urban areas in each region of Ghana, sell inputs 
sourced from wholesalers primarily based in Accra or 
Kumasi, generally on a cash-and-carry basis. Although 
inputs from the state are subsidised, farmers still bear 
most of the cost (Boansi 2013). In view of the high 
incidence of poverty among some cocoa farmers and 
cocoa ‘buyers’ desire to exert control over farmers 
to keep them ‘faithful’, there are instances whereby 
private traders provide in-kind support to farmers or 
pre-finance their inputs (Hütz-Adams et al. 2016). More 
often, farmer-based organisations also step in with 
inputs for their members (Gayi and Tsowou 2016).
4.2.2. Production 
Cocoa production has undergone several changes. 
While cocoa production has largely been undertaken 
by individual farmers, the Cocoa Marketing Board 
which was established in the 1940s has managed 
cocoa production issues (Löwe 2017; Ton et al. 2008). 
Following the SAPs in the 1980s, production processes 
became a joint-state and private participation venture, 
with the state-owned COCOBOD dominating the 
process. As noted already, while cocoa production 
increased from the 1930s, making Ghana the leading 
producer of cocoa for several decades, output 
declined in the 1970s. The country has since become 
the second largest producer after implementing SAPs 
and many reforms that partially liberalised cocoa 
production and marketing in the mid-1980s (Knudsen 
2010; Ton et al. 2008). 
Ghana’s high-quality cocoa production involves an 
army of approximately 800,000 smallholder farmer 
households (Ghana Statistical Service 2014; Knudsen 
2010) utilising land sizes up to 5ha (Yihdego et al. 
2019; Hütz-Adams et al. 2016). While about 80 
per cent of these farmers own their own lands for 
cocoa production, the remaining landless 20 per 
cent, depend on the abunu and abusa systems of 
sharecropping for this purpose (Monastyrnaya et 
al. 2016). The abunu sharecropping system entitles 
the sharecropper to half of the harvest, but makes 
the farmer responsible for the whole production 
process. The abusa on the other hand entitles 
the sharecropper to 30 per cent of the harvest for 
managing the farm but inputs, which may sometimes 
be inadequate, are supplied by the landowner (Yaro 
et al. 2018; Löwe 2017; Monastyrnaya et al. 2016). 
Land ownership is a source of social differentiation 
among cocoa farmers. Compared with landowners, 
sharecroppers mainly experience less tenure 
security, with the least secured being those in abusa 
and caretaker agreements.  Farmers are classified 
by the Cocoa Research Institute of Ghana (CRIG) 
into high, medium and low producers, with the highly 
productive group achieving yields close to 1400kg/ha 
but producing only 5 per cent of total output. Medium-
level producers, however, are achieving yields of 650 
kg/ha and producing 45 per cent of Ghana’s output, 
while the low productivity group obtaining yields of 
350kg/ha producing the most cocoa (Löwe 2017). 
Several self-help cocoa farmer associations called 
nnoboa have developed as part of the production 
process because of the intensity of labour required 
(Yihdego et al. 2019), challenges with credit access 
and compliance with various certification schemes 
(Abbey et al. 2016; Monastyrnaya et al. 2016). In most 
cases, the leadership of these associations are men.
4.2.3. Internal marketing and transportation 
The World Bank backed economic reforms in the 
cocoa sector in the 1990s meant that the purchase and 
transport of cocoa beans from points of production 
to the ports in Ghana was no longer the preserve of 
the state-owned Produce Buying Company (PBC) of 
COCOBOD (Oomes et al. 2016) which had historically 
undertaken these activities. Local and international 
LBCs (Knudsen 2010). Although the PBC, which is 
now listed on the Ghana Stock Exchange, remains 
the largest LBC and retains monopoly over external 
marketing, close to 30 licenced private national and 
international LBCs also take part in internal cocoa 
marketing (Manteaw et al. 2018; Monastyrnaya et al. 
2016). COCOBOD provides ‘seed funds’ to LBCs to 
purchase cocoa beans. Singapore-based Olam and 
UK-based Armajaro are major international LBCs, 
while Kuapa Kokoo is the only producer-based 
cooperative LBC in Ghana (Barrientos et al. 2008). 
Given the fixed amount LBCs earn from COCOBOD, 
which has the mandate to fix the domestic floor price 
for specific quantities of cocoa (Knudsen 2010), 
the viability of LBCs depends on how much cocoa 
they turn over to the Cocoa Marketing Company 
(CMC) (An et al. 2016). To improve their odds, LBCs 
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rely on several local community district managers 
and purchasing clerks to buy,transport and deliver 
cocoa from remote communities to their warehouses 
(Abbey et al. 2016; Monastyrnaya et al. 2016). While 
some LBCs such as Armajaro and Kuapa Kokoo 
are able to pay bonuses and premium respectively, 
because they have more capital at their disposal, 
most LBCs provide inducements such credit facilities 
and extension services to attract and retain farmers 
(Barrientos et al. 2008). 
LBCs benefit from a controlled internal marketing 
system of cocoa but they can only resell to the CMC, 
despite the intent of partial reforms to also liberalise 
cocoa exports (Monastyrnaya et al. 2016; Oomes et 
al. 2016). Rather than outsourcing the haulage of their 
certified, graded and bagged cocoa to private transport 
operators, in recent times LBCs perform this function 
themselves (Abbey et al. 2016). Beside the LBCs, 
there are a few unlicensed private cocoa buyers that 
purchase from farmers and sell to LBCs or smuggle 
the cocoa outside the country for sale (Monastyrnaya 
et al. 2016). A study by Ansah et al. (2018) shows that 
LBCs play a significant role in ensuring sustainable 
supply of quality beans by constantly educating and 
training farmers on fermentation, drying, packaging, 
and storage practices.
4.2.4. Exports 
The export of cocoa is the exclusive responsibility of 
CMC, which is a subsidiary of COCOBOD (Oomes et 
al. 2016). CMC takes delivery of the cocoa from LBCs 
and stores them at three centres in Tema, Takoradi and 
Kaase. Given the challenge of cocoa price volatility, 
the CMC is also assigned with hedging all pre-
harvest forward sales and contracts at a fixed price 
with international merchants and cocoa processors 
(Monastyrnaya et al. 2016). COCOBOD’s seed fund 
for LBCs is derived from funds borrowed from an 
international syndicate based on up to about 80 per 
cent forward sales of cocoa (World Bank 2013). 
4.2.5. Processing 
Efforts at processing cocoa before export date back 
to the 1960s, with the establishment of the West 
African Mills Company as a private entity to convert 
raw cocoa to paste, butter and other products 
(Sulaiman and Boachie-Danquah 2017). Ghana only 
processes 20 per cent of its cocoa into semi-finished 
or consumer products domestically. Over 95 per cent 
of the ensuing powder, butter, liquor, and cake is also 
exported, with only 5 per cent used domestically for 
confectioneries and other cocoa-based products 
(Monastyrnaya et al. 2016). The five large processing 
companies in Ghana including Cocoa Processing 
Company, Barry Callebaut, Afrotropics, Cargill and 
Archer, and Daniels Midland, operate at different levels 
and engage in both primary and secondary processing 
of cocoa into pastes, butter, nibs, confectioneries, 
and chocolates (Sulaiman and Boachie-Danquah 
2017). The government of Ghana has offered several 
incentives, including extended payment credit and 
tax-free zones, to attract investment for domestic 
processing and these led to over 300,000mt increase 
in domestic grinding of cocoa in 2013 (World Bank 
2013). Efforts are underway to give incentives to 
entrepreneurs to establish more processing units in 
order to increase domestic grinding capacity to 60 
per cent of the total cocoa harvest for export (Asante-
Poku and Angelucci 2013).
4.2.6. Cocoa waste marketing 
Five licensed cocoa waste companies procure cocoa 
waste such as shells, husks, skins and inferior quality 
cocoa from farmers and processors in cocoa growing 
areas in Ghana. These are shipped abroad after 
checks by COCOBOD to ensure that quality cocoa 
is not inadvertently exported abroad by these means 
(Monastyrnaya et al. 2016). 
4.2.7. Retail 
Many small informal open-air retailers and groceries 
and very few supermarkets serve several local and 
imported cocoa-based products including cocoa 
powder beverages, chocolate, and creams in Ghana. 
These products, however, make up a tiny fraction 
of the cocoa value chain (Monastyrnaya et al. 2016; 
Knudsen 2010).
4.2.8. Consumers 
Demand for cocoa depends, to a large extent, 
on chocolate and other cocoa products. These 
however face competition from other snacks, giving 
the consumer options if the price of cocoa products 
increases (Oomes et al. 2016). However, compared to 
chocolate which is perceived as unaffordable, except 
perhaps on special occasions, powdered beverages 
are mostly considered affordable cocoa-based product 
and commonly consumed in Ghana. The government 
of Ghana has been making efforts to encourage 
domestic chocolate consumption by rebranding 
Valentine’s Day as National Chocolate Day since 2006 
(Monastyrnaya et al. 2016). The highest demand for 
cocoa products remains in Europe and North America, 
but demand is also rising in China and India. Countries 
in Central and South America, especially Brazil, also 
have a long cocoa-consuming tradition (Sulaiman and 
Boachie-Danquah 2017). 
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The actors discussed so far may, in many ways, 
be considered the main actors of the cocoa value 
chain. Several other actors that play supportive 
roles (Monastyrnaya et al. 2016) to facilitate key 
aspects of the activities discussed above include 
extension services and research, quality control, 
financing, insurance and social protection and 
disaster management.
4.3. Evolution of agricultural policies 
relevant to cocoa value chain 
There have been significant changes in the agrarian 
political economy of Ghana since the colonial era. The 
British colonial administration (1874–1956) promoted 
the production of export crops, notably cocoa, oil 
palm, and coffee to feed British industries and also to 
raise revenue for the colony. The colonial administration 
was in favour of production by peasant farmers rather 
than state plantations due to fears that the large-
scale land acquisition required for plantations could 
create local resistance, which could then undermine 
the colonial government. In this situation, the colonial 
administration’s support for smallholders in the cocoa 
sector was due to its calculation of the risks associated 
with any attempts to intervene in the existing land 
tenure arrangements. The major winners were the 
cocoa farmers, landowners, European cocoa traders 
and the colonial administration.
The early post-colonial government, led by President 
Nkrumah (1957–1966), continued to promote the 
production of commercial crops such as cocoa, oil 
palm, tobacco and rubber to feed Ghanaian industries, 
as part of wider import substitution strategy. The 
Nkrumah government made efforts to promote state-
owned large-scale plantations, in line with its socialist 
ideology. While the government’s promotion of large-
scale plantation was justified by the argument that 
small-scale agriculture was difficult to modernise 
(Yaro et al. 2016), efforts to promote state-owned 
large-scale plantations, however, did not work in the 
cocoa sector and over 80 per cent of cocoa are still 
produced by peasant farmers. After the overthrow of 
the Nkrumah regime in 1966, the military governments 
that ruled Ghana did not make any significant changes 
to the cocoa sector, as there was high level of political 
instability and cocoa sector performed very poorly. 
In line with a general economic crisis, the cocoa sector 
nearly collapsed in the 1970s and 1980s. In order to 
deal with economic challenges, the Provisional National 
Defence Council (PNDC) government, let by President 
Jerry John Rawlings, adopted an ERP in 1983 and 
SAPs in 1988 (Teye and Torvikey 2018), with support 
from the IMF and World Bank. The programme aimed 
to remove subsidies, privatise state businesses and 
liberalise trade. The SAPS also sought to increase 
production of export crops through enhanced 
technology. In response to arguments by international 
donors that economic crisis in Ghana was partly due 
to low value of unprocessed primary products, value 
addition was also a major component of the SAPS 
(Brooks et al. 2007). The ERP/SAPs had some positive 
effects on the growth of the cocoa sector. First, the 
government made efforts to increase the producer 
prices for cocoa for farmers and this achieved 
good results as cocoa production began to rise in 
1984SAPs also contributed to efforts to add value to 
Ghana’s cocoa. Incentives were introduced to entice 
foreign firms to establish agro-processing companies 
in Ghana. Firms operating in the tree crop sector 
(cocoa, coffee, shea butter, coconut, etc.) have 10 
years of tax holiday. Agro-processing was promoted 
by both the government and its development partners 
on the ground that such value addition efforts will 
create jobs, increase tax revenue and increase foreign 
exchange (ISSER 2014). 
The government also revamped cocoa production 
through a rehabilitation programme that entails 
increased use of technological inputs, including 
fertilisers, chemicals for controlling pests and diseases 
and introduction of hybrid cocoa (Amanor et al. 2020; 
Vigneri 2008). The devaluation of the Ghanaian 
cedi also contributed to increased exportation of 
various commodities, including cocoa. Despite 
these benefits, SAPs had some negative effects. For 
instance, the removal of subsidies on inputs affected 
all farmers, including those in the cocoa sector. It is 
also argued that SAPs brought differential benefits. 
In the agricultural sector, landowners and large-scale 
farmers benefited significantly as they increased rents, 
increased production for export, and enjoyed higher 
producer price for export commodities, such as 
cocoa. On the other hand, landless people, including 
migrants and women, were the losers because the 
removal of subsidies on public utilities and inputs 
affected them negatively (Teye and Torvikey 2018; 
Sawyer 1988). Some civil society groups contested 
the removal of subsidies, reasoning that it made life 
more difficult for poor households.
Since 2000, major agriculture sector development 
policies, which sought to modernise agriculture, have 
moderately contributed to the development of the 
cocoa value chain. For instance, FASDEP I, which was 
adopted in 2002, and FASDEP II, which was adopted 
in 2007, sought to enhance the technical capacity 
of farmers to use improved equipment and agro-
chemicals. Similarly, and partly the response to neo-
liberal arguments that state control of input distribution 
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was not sustainable, national fertiliser and seed 
policies were implemented in 2010 to promote private 
sector participation in the production and distribution 
of fertiliser and improved seeds. Also, in line with 
arguments by development partners that other tree 
crops, apart from cocoa, should be promoted to 
diversify the economy, the state implemented a Tree 
Crop Policy in 2012.
Another key narrative that has shaped agriculture 
policies and programmes in recent years was the 
argument by development partners (e.g. World 
Bank, USAID, GIZ) and rural development scholars 
that agricultural commercialisation must be linked to 
broader rural development and poverty reduction 
strategies (Teye and Torvikey 2018). The strategies 
implemented to link agriculture to broader development 
include the Ghana Shared Growth and Development 
Agenda (GSGDA) (2010–2013; 2014–2017) which 
aimed at modernising agriculture to deal with poverty 
related issues. Similarly, the ‘Medium Term Agriculture 
Sector Investment Plan’ (METASIP I and II 2011–2015; 
METASIP III 2017–2021), which sought to facilitate 
investment in the agricultural sector, created various 
forms of incentives, including input subsidies, training 
and technical assistance to farmers, enhancing access 
to finance, and sharing investment risks through 
challenge funds and matching grants. Although these 
programmes were not specifically created for the 
cocoa sector, some cocoa farmers benefited from 
the subsidies and technical assistance. Additionally, 
some large-scale cocoa farmers have also benefited 
from recent private-public partnerships programmes in 
the agriculture sector. For instance, some large-scale 
farmers who produce several crops, including cocoa, 
have benefited from the Ghana Commercial Agriculture 
Project, which aims at reducing poverty and ensuring 
food security through private-public partnerships 
and promoting linkages between smallholders and 
large-scale agribusinesses. The project also seeks to 
enhance access to land and promote private sector 
financing of agriculture. However, these programmes 
have not significantly contributed to enhanced access 
to lands and credit among women and poor farmers. 
The programmes tend to benefit only large-scale 
businesses who have access to financial grants. 
Another agricultural sector programme, which 
has benefited some cocoa farmers is the current 
government’s flagship programme namely “Planting 
for Food and Jobs” (PFJ), under METASIP III (2017–
2021). The programme, which is being implemented as 
part of campaign promise of the ruling New Patriotic 
Party (NPP) government, provides subsidised inputs, 
such as fertilisers and improved seeds, to smallholder 
farmers involved in the production maize, rice, 
sorghum, tomato, onion, chilli pepper, and soya bean 
(MoFA 2017). As many cocoa farmers are smallholders 
who also produce food crops, they also benefit 
from this policy. The programme has been heavily 
politicised, with the aim of using it to get political votes 
from smallholders who are the main beneficiaries. 
The implementation of this programme is consistent 
with the assertion that a government can support 
smallholder farmers in situations where it believes 
that such investments can enhance its chances of 
remaining in power (Chinsinga and Poulton 2014). In 
April 2019, the government launched the Planting for 
Export and Rural Development (PERD) programme as 
part of the Tree Crop Module of the Planting for Food 
and Jobs. The PERD programme seeks to promote the 
production and marketing of nine tree crops, namely 
mango, cashew, coffee, oil palm, coconut, mango, 
citrus, cotton, shea, and rubber. The purpose of this 
programme is to diversify the tree crop export sector 
from cocoa, which has been the main export crop. As 
many large-scale cocoa farmers are now increasingly 
involved in the production of other crops (e.g. mango), 
this policy can enhance their access to resources and 
technology for their agricultural activities.
4.4. Political settlement analysis of the 
cocoa value chain in Ghana
While the government of Ghana has, historically, 
played a pivotal role in the development of the cocoa 
value chain, the institutional arrangement and policies 
implemented in the cocoa sector have gone through 
several changes in relation to altering agrarian political 
economy. This includes the distribution of power and 
shifting interests of the various interest groups, such as 
farmers, cocoa processing companies, political elite, 
and international donors. Given that cocoa is the most 
important cash crop in Ghana, the government has a 
major interest in maintaining control over the cocoa 
revenue and using it to fund economic development 
as well as sustain its patronage networks that are 
important for remaining in power. Again, as the future 
of Ghana’s cocoa sector is quite good in view of the 
high demand for Ghana’s high quality cocoa beans, the 
government of Ghana has interest in maintaining power 
in this sector rather than switching attention elsewhere. 
Traditional authorities who own land also have a vested 
interest in getting adequate share of their royalties 
from the production of cocoa. Cocoa farmers’ main 
interest is how to get access to factors of production 
(e.g. land, labour, and credit) and higher prices for their 
produce. While international cocoa processing firms 
have historically been concerned with how to ensure 
that Ghana continues to supply high quality of cocoa, 
international development partners are interested 
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in how the performance of the cocoa sector could 
be improved to contribute to broader sustainable 
development goals.
Consistent with the political settlement framework 
(Khan 2018), the interaction by the various interest 
groups, with different sources of holding power, has 
led to the evolution of various governance systems 
and policies which created different costs and benefits 
(rents) for different interest groups in the cocoa sector. 
Following the work of Ton et al. (2008), we discuss 
the history of the corporate governance system in the 
cocoa sector under four broad periods. The first period 
(1920–1957) represents the colonial era, which is 
characterised by a fairly corporate governance system 
and struggle for control of cocoa marketing. The second 
period (1957–1980) is the early post-independence 
period which represents a heavily state-controlled 
economy, characterised by neopatrimonialism. The 
third period (1980–2000) brought the start of reforms 
in the cocoa sector and strengthening of the position of 
the state. The fourth period (2000–present) witnessed 
further liberalisation of and increased politicisation 
of programmes in the cocoa sector. This last period 
also witnessed increased partnership between state 
and non-state actors in various subsectors of the 
cocoa value chain. We discuss how these changes 
in corporate governance system and policies created 
different costs and rents for different people.
4.4.1. Colonial corporate governance 
system and struggle for control of internal 
marketing of cocoa (1920–1957)
The main interest groups in the cocoa value chain 
during the colonial era were the colonial administration, 
which sought to promote and maintain the production 
of cocoa beans for export and for raising revenue which 
was needed to promote development of the colony 
(Teye 2008). Traditional rulers who were, and still are, 
in charge of the allocation of land, an important factor 
for cocoa production, were interested in maintaining 
control over land ownership and royalties from cocoa 
production, while farmers were interested in high 
cocoa prices. European traders and their local agents 
were also interested in maintaining control over the 
internal marketing and export of cocoa (Amoah 1995). 
Of the local groups, land control and their active role 
in the ‘decentralised despotism’, which was the main 
governance strategy adopted during that era (Teye 
2008), ensures that traditional rulers remained a very 
powerful group.
One of the key issues that the colonial administration 
was required to decide on was whether to promote 
state-owned cocoa plantations or allow peasant 
farmers to continue to produce the new cash crop. 
Unlike the situation in East Africa, where large-scale 
plantations were promoted, the British colonial 
administration favoured production of cocoa and other 
cash crops by peasant farmers (Teye and Torvikey 
2018), because of fears that any large-scale land 
acquisitions for plantations could alienate the peasant 
farmers, therefore creating local opposition to colonial 
rule. These fears were based on that, even prior to the 
introduction of cocoa in Ghana, attempts by the colonial 
administration in 1894 to create Crown Lands (i.e. state 
lands) were heavily resisted by traditional authorities 
and land owning families (DeGrassi 2008). The colonial 
administration’s decision to allow smallholders to 
continue to dominate the cocoa production landscape 
was a key policy choice that resonates with the political 
settlement theory, which suggests that governments 
are not likely to adopt policies that threaten the rents 
of powerful interest groups, even if such policies are 
socially desirable. The economic rent from the early 
cocoa industry benefited smallholder farmers involved 
in the production, traditional rulers who sold lands 
and received royalties and European traders who 
controlled the cocoa trade. The colonial administration 
also benefited in terms of tax revenue.
From the 1930s, there were serious tensions over the 
control of cocoa marketing, and particularly cocoa 
prices. At this early phase of the cocoa industry, the 
local purchasing and exporting of cocoa was largely 
controlled by European firms, such as Cadbury, which 
was the leading British cocoa processing company 
(Ton et al. 2008). The foreign companies relied on 
middlemen, many of whom were prominent farmers, 
to purchase cocoa beans from farmers (Beckman 
1976). The local farmers were not happy with the 
prices being offered to them by the European traders. 
To deal with some of the conflicts over prices in the 
cocoa marketing segment of the value chain, the 
colonial administration encouraged the formation of 
cooperative enterprise in the cocoa sector. This was 
based on the assumption that organising farmers 
into cooperatives could go a long way to ensure the 
continuous supply of high-quality cocoa for export. 
Additionally, it was the belief of the government that 
cooperatives could have a strong bargaining power to 
demand higher prices. Apart from pushing for higher 
prices, the cocoa societies also played important 
role in the provision of credit, agricultural inputs (e.g. 
chemicals) and consumer goods (Ton et al. 2008). 
The European traders were, however, not happy with 
the government’s promotion of cooperatives, as they 
feared that the cooperatives would eventually eliminate 
them from the cocoa trade (Department of Cooperatives 
1990). On the other hand, the local farmers who 
believed that European traders were not offering them 
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good prices, occasionally made unsuccessful attempts 
to organise themselves to bypass foreign firms to secure 
higher prices on the foreign market. Both the European 
traders and local farmers adopted several strategies to 
ensure that they get a better share of the cocoa cake. 
From 1930 to 1931, the farmer cooperatives embarked 
on ‘hold-up of sales of cocoa’ to press their demands 
for higher prices. This forced the European traders 
to increase the price of cocoa, and subsequently the 
cocoa supply increased.
In response to a fall in the prices of cocoa on the world 
market, the European firms, in 1937, entered into a 
partnership agreement for the purpose of reducing 
competition and ensuring low prices of cocoa. The 
farmers responded to these actions by staging another 
hold-up and boycotting imported goods (Frankel 
1974). In order to resolve these hold-ups, the colonial 
administration established a Commission of Enquiry 
to investigate topical issues in the cocoa economy. 
The report of the investigation, which confirmed that 
farmers were being offered prices far lower than the 
market value of cocoa, recommended that the state 
should support cocoa marketing operations in order to 
reduce exploitation of farmers by foreign firms. Based 
on this recommendation, the West African Produce 
Control Board was created in 1940 and it was given the 
power to set cocoa prices for all West African countries. 
This board was dissolved shortly after the Second 
World War, and the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) was 
established in 1947 and mandated to market cocoa 
and stabilise its prices. The foreign firms, however, 
continued to be involved in the local purchase of cocoa 
while the CMB was responsible for export. In 1952, 
the Cocoa Purchasing Company was established by 
the state and was also involved in the purchasing of 
cocoa. The competition and tensions among the 
various interest groups in the cocoa marketing sector 
continued into the postcolonial era (Ton et al. 2008).
4.4.2. State-controlled economy and 
neopatrimonialism (1957–1980) 
When the Nkrumah government came to power in 1957, 
policy and institutional changes were introduced based 
on a calculation of the holding power and interests 
of various groups. While the colonial administration 
favoured production of cash crops by peasant farmers, 
Nkrumah’s government generally supported large-
scale state plantations based on the argument that 
small-scale agriculture was difficult to modernise. In 
the cocoa sector, however, efforts to promote state-
owned plantations did not achieve results due to the 
dominance of customary land tenure systems. Also, 
while the colonial administration was interested in 
promoting export of cocoa and other commodities 
to feed British firms, Nkrumah’s government was 
interested in promoting production to feed local 
agro-based industries in line with export substitution 
policy (Teye and Torvikey 2018). As a result, the state 
invested heavily in cocoa processing capacity, thereby 
furthering state-led chain integration. The government 
established two cocoa processing factories in 1963 
which were owned by COCOBOD (Ton et al. 2008).
As hinted already, the struggle for a monopoly of the 
cocoa marketing sector, which started in the colonial 
era, continued in the early postcolonial era. While 
the Cocoa Marketing Board maintained a monopoly 
over export of cocoa beans, European companies 
were still largely controlling the local cocoa trade. 
However, as result of a number of factors, including 
agitations by farmers against the monopoly that 
European companies had over the local purchasing 
of cocoa, increased government financial support to 
cooperatives, and further strengthening of the Cocoa 
Purchasing Company, the market share of European 
companies in the cocoa trading sector declined from 
nearly 100 per cent prior during the Second World 
War to 57 per cent in 1959/60. On the other hand, 
the market share of the cooperatives and the Cocoa 
Purchasing Company increased significantly to 24 per 
cent and 17 per cent respectively in 1959/60. In the 
same year, the Farmers’ Association purchased only 
3 per cent of the cocoa produce (Beckman 1976). 
Meanwhile, in order to use them for political support, 
Nkrumah’s government co-opted the leaders of the 
powerful cooperatives into its patronage networks 
(Teye 2008). The United Ghana Farmers’ Cooperative 
Council, established in 1953 as the General Farmers’ 
Cooperative, became a political wing of the CPP 
which was headed by President Nkrumah (Ton et al. 
2008; Beckman 1976). Due to its patronage networks 
with the ruling government, the Farmers Council 
gained control over local cocoa purchasing and they 
even later stopped other local buyers and European 
firms from active purchasing of cocoa. These policy 
changes which gave much power to the cooperatives 
were the outcome of the agency of the leaders 
of cooperatives and political interests of the CPP 
government. Consequently, the institutional changes 
created new rents for the cooperatives and their 
leaders. The increased control that the cooperatives 
gained over internal marketing of cocoa is consistent 
with the postulation of the Political Settlements theory 
that the holding power of interest groups is based 
on a combination of economic capabilities, resource 
mobilisation capacity of their leadership, and their skill 
in rewarding the right policymakers through formal or 
informal networks (Whitfield et al. 2015).
As a way of addressing the effects of neopatrimonialism 
and corruption, the military government which took 
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over from President Nkrumah in 1966, dissolved and 
banned the Farmers Council (Beckman 1976). The 
military government further established a Committee 
of Enquiry to investigate the issues around internal 
marketing of cocoa. The committee considered the 
potential benefits and challenges of adopting three 
key alternative models for internal marketing of cocoa 
in Ghana. The models considered were a competitive 
market whereby any person or group could participate 
in the internal market; a farmer-based cooperative 
marketing system; and direct state-controlled marketing 
system. Consistent with the view that policymakers 
tend to adopt policies that would help them realise their 
political interests (Khan 2018), the last model, which 
would simply extend the export monopoly of the state-
supported CMB, was adopted as it was in line with 
the government’s main interest of controlling revenue 
generation and use in the cocoa sector (Amanor et 
al. 2000; Beckman 1976). The single cocoa buying 
system created was restructured in 1977, when the 
PBC, a subsidiary of the Cocoa Marketing Board (now 
COCOBOD), took over the internal marketing of cocoa. 
It purchases cocoa beans from farmers at fixed prices. 
Important services to farmers were provided by various 
divisions of the stated controlled CMB. For instance, the 
Cocoa Services Division maintained a monopoly over 
the procurement and distribution of inputs, such as 
agro-chemicals and fertilisers. It was also responsible 
for providing extension services which include the 
distribution of planting materials and advising farmers 
on mechanisms for controlling pests and diseases. 
The Quality Control Division was responsible for strictly 
ensuring high quality of cocoa, while the CRIG was 
responsible for conducting research on all aspects of 
cocoa cultivation (Ton et al. 2008).
Successive post-independence governments relied 
on the state-controlled Cocoa Marketing Board and 
its subsidiaries to exploit farmers and distribute rent to 
their clients in the cocoa sector. In all the regimes, the 
clients have been private entrepreneurs who are able 
to fund political parties. Although the need to stabilise 
cocoa prices was used to justify the creation of a state-
controlled marketing board, the post-independence 
governments generally exploited farmers and used 
cocoa revenue to maintain patronage networks with 
private entrepreneurs, which would enable them to 
remain in power. In most parts of this era, cocoa farmers 
were heavily over-taxed through the fixing of cocoa 
prices far below world market price (Bates 2005). For 
instance, from 1957 to the early 1990s, cocoa farmers 
were offered between 30 and 50 per cent of the free 
on board (FOB) cocoa price, which is far lower than the 
producer prices of between 60 and 80 per cent of the 
FOB price received by cocoa farmers in other cocoa-
producing countries, including Brazil and Côte d’Ivoire 
(Bulíř 2002; Dzorgbo 2001). Meanwhile the cocoa 
management guidelines, which justified ‘over-taxation’ 
of cocoa farmers on the grounds that the surplus 
revenue would be used to stabilise producer prices 
in the event of declining world market prices, were 
never implemented. Meanwhile, rural farmers did not 
benefit significantly from development projects funded 
by revenue generated through over-taxation, as many 
of these projects were located in urban areas (Bates 
2005). Through over-taxation, the Cocoa Marketing 
Board simply functioned as a tool for collecting and 
distributing patronage resources (Hubbard and Smith 
1996) that would allow the governments to remain in 
power. As part of the patronage networks, supporters 
of the ruling governments were usually offered juicy 
jobs and employment contracts in the cocoa marketing 
sector (Herbst 1993: 63). This is a clear situation of 
political settlement whereby political parties capture 
resources for their clients who, in turn, help them to 
remain in power, even though such activities can 
damage the economy (Przeworski et al. 2020).
Poor weather conditions, as well as pests and diseases, 
contributed to the declining cocoa output in the 1970s 
and 1980s. However, there is enough evidence to 
suggest that over-taxation, which resulted in low 
producer prices, was a major factor that resulted in low 
cocoa output in the 1970s and early 1980s (Dzorgbo 
2001; Amoah 1995). Additionally, as a result of the 
patronage networks and mismanagement, the state 
Produce Buying Company was unable to make prompt 
payments to cocoa farmers. According to Khan (2018), 
in any policy engagement, interest groups whose 
access to rents have been denied by the government 
may adopt informal violations of formal rules to capture 
benefits informally. This is exactly what happened in 
the Ghanaian cocoa sector. As agitations by farmers 
against low cocoa prices were not addressed by 
the ruling government, some farmers living in border 
areas responded to the combined effects of delays in 
payment and lower prices by smuggling some of their 
produce to neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire. This further 
affected Ghana’s cocoa export earnings and revenue 
generation. By the late 1970s, Ghana’s cocoa industry 
was on the brink of collapse (Amanor et al. 2020).
4.4.3. Economic reforms and liberalisation 
(1980–2000) 
Between 1980 and 2000, reforms were enacted in the 
cocoa sector in response to political changes, economic 
crisis and increased international donor pressures for 
economic reforms needed to prevent the country from 
collapsing. These changes created new costs and 
rents for different actors. The Cocoa Rehabilitation 
Project (CRP) and the Agricultural Sector Adjustment 
Programme (ASAP), which were implemented in the 
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1980s and early 1990s by the PNDC government as 
part of ERPs and SAPs, helped to prevent the cocoa 
sector from total collapse (Ministry of Finance 1999). In 
the production sector, the reforms enabled large-scale 
farmers to receive grants and loans from international 
donors for expansion of their farms. Small-scale cocoa 
farmers, however, did not benefit from these loans as 
they lacked collateral security to secure them.
In the cocoa marketing sub-sector, the reforms 
were geared towards increasing producer prices 
by reducing the cost of inefficient marketing and 
cocoa pricing systems. The reforms started with a 
restructuring of the Cocoa Marketing Board, which 
was renamed COCOBOD in the early 1980s. The 
restructuring resulted in a 90 per cent reduction of 
COCOBOD staff (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2017). The 
number of employees of COCOBOD reduced from 
120,000 in 1980 to only 5,500 in 2006 (IMF 2007). 
Expansion of processing activities for the purpose of 
value addition and privatisation of input distribution 
were other key reforms, and processing capacity was 
increased in 1982 when the state acquired a cocoa 
processing factory. Foreign and local private firms 
were also encouraged to establish processing firms, 
in line with the government’s industrialisation and 
privatisation drive. The entire privatisation programme 
was, however, associated with crony capitalism. 
Privatisation created new rents for the ruling elite and 
actors in their patronage networks, who purchased 
state agricultural production and processing assets at 
prices far lower than their real values. This then created 
new costs to farmers as subsidies were gradually 
removed. For instance, the cumulative effects of 
currency devaluation and removal of subsidies led to 
a rapid rise of fertilisers by over 360 per cent between 
1982 and 1994 (Teye and Torvikey 2018). This policy 
change was contested by some civil society groups 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), who 
argued that the removal of subsidies would negatively 
affect smallholder farmers. However, the government 
did not restore subsidies as their removal was part 
of IMF and World Bank conditionalities for providing 
support. Meanwhile, both farmer and civil society 
groups did not have strong holding powers to influence 
policy changes, as the country was under military 
rule and leaders of groups that embarked on open 
protests were even sometimes arrested and tortured 
by security agencies.
Another key reform was the liberalisation of the internal 
marketing sector during the 1992/93 season. As noted 
already, this significant change came through an 
introduction of private LBCs to compete with the state-
supported PBC. Again, this reform was in response 
to international pressures for increased private sector 
participation in the cocoa sector. Although private 
participation in the sector was still quite limited, the 
economic reforms achieved some good results as 
production increased significantly. Additionally, the 
‘producer price’ that farmers received from the sale 
of cocoa has risen significantly since 1980 and it 
has continued to be above 70 per cent of the FOB 
price (Bulíř 2002). While farmers benefited from the 
increased cocoa prices, the removal of subsidies on 
input suggested they gained little from the reforms, as 
they spent significant proportions of their incomes on 
input that was previously free.
4.4.4. Public-private partnerships and 
cocoa politics (2000-present)
Since 2000, the cocoa sector witnessed further 
liberalisation and increased public-private partnership 
in response to donor’s pressures for private sector 
participation, the reduced role of the state-supported 
COCOBOD, as well as efforts to rely on non-state actors 
to deal with intractable challenges, such as poverty, 
child labour, modern slavery, and environmental 
change. Institutional and policy changes have been 
adopted to improve the performance of all the segments 
of the cocoa value chain. While the peasant farmers 
still dominate the production segment, efforts have 
been made to enhance their capacity through training 
programmes and provision of inputs by both the state 
and development partners. These programmes are 
in line with the desire to modernise the agriculture 
sector. The production segment has also experienced 
increased use of fertilisers and agro-chemicals, partly 
as a result of the combined effects of environmental 
degradation and efforts by the government and 
international partners to increase productivity. The use 
of hybrids has also increased, with more than 50 per 
cent of the land area under cocoa being cultivated with 
hybrid varieties (Kolavalli and Vigneri 2017).
The production segment has also witnessed increased 
partnerships between the government, international 
donors, international cocoa buyers, and NGOs aimed 
at increasing productivity of smallholder farmers and 
reducing poverty in cocoa growing communities. For 
instance, the Cadbury Cocoa Partnership, established 
in 2008 in conjunction with the United Nations 
Development Programme, CARE, Voluntary Service 
Overseas and World Vision, has been empowering 
cocoa farmers through support programmes, including 
the provision of planting materials and technical 
assistance, to cocoa farmers in over 100 communities 
in Ghana as part of a ten-year GB£30 million 
commitment to secure the future of cocoa farmers and 
their communities. Building on the Cadbury Cocoa 
Partnership initiative, the Cocoa Life partnership, 
launched in 2012. Involving several partners, including 
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CARE, World Vision, Cargill, FAIRTRADE, Olam Cocoa, 
Save the Children, and Solidaridad, the initiative is 
investing US$400 million by 2022 to empower at least 
200,000 cocoa farmers and one million community 
members in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Indonesia, India, 
the Dominican Republic and Brazil. In Ghana, Cocoa 
Life programme seeks to empower the men, women 
and youth in cocoa communities to lead their own 
development and improve their livelihoods through 
entrepreneurship. The Cocoa Life programme also 
has a component that focuses on empowerment 
of women in the cocoa sector, reduction of climate 
change and protection of children in cocoa-
producing communities. Similarly, the government 
is collaborating with donor organisations and NGOs 
to implement young cocoa farmers’ programmes 
which seek to create employment opportunities for 
the rural youth as well as sustain the future of the 
cocoa industry. For instance, the youth in cocoa 
programme was established by the Ghana COCOBOD 
in 2016, which led to the formation of several youth 
associations in cocoa-growing communities. The 
beneficiaries have been given both technical support 
and farming equipment to enable them to start cocoa 
farming. Similarly, Solidaridad, a leading development 
based NGO, is behind the implementation the ‘Next 
Generation Youth in Cocoa Programme’ which is also 
empowering the youth to realise the potentials in the 
cocoa industry (Mabe et al. 2020).
The partnerships between government, international 
cocoa buying companies, NGOs, and smallholder 
farmers, are driven by mutual interests. The 
government is interested in maintaining power over 
the cocoa sector as a tool for political power. It also 
relies on international donor funds to distribute rent 
to its crony capitalists. Indeed, the political elite and 
their clients continue to gain through irregularities in the 
handling of donor grants and awarding of contracts for 
training and supplying of inputs in the cocoa sector. On 
the other hand, international companies, like Cadbury, 
are interested in maintaining this source of high quality 
cocoa beans without any aspersions being cast on its 
sustainability and human rights record. International 
donors and NGOs also want to achieve political goals 
by advocating for the rights of farmers. Smallholder 
farmers also are interested in getting higher cocoa 
prices as well as financial and technical support to 
improve their livelihoods.
In addition to partnerships that seek to enhance 
productivity of farmers, there have also been 
partnerships between the government and 
international donors for the purpose of controlling 
environmental degradation that is linked with cocoa 
production. Ghana has received large sums of money 
from various development partners to implement 
environmental management programmes which 
seeks to control climate change through reduction in 
emissions from deforestation and degradation (Teye 
2013) and climate smart agriculture programmes. 
Some of these programmes involved public-private-
civil partnerships like the Sustainable Tree Crop 
Program-STCP (Ton et al. 2008). These environmental 
programmes are largely initiatives of international 
partners and the Government of Ghana is interested 
in implementing them, not only because of the desire 
to solve those problems, but also because such 
activities attract huge international grants which 
provide patronage resources for the government 
and actors in its networks (see Grainger and Konteh 
2007; Teye 2013). As hinted already, there have also 
been partnerships with international organisations 
to implement certification mechanisms to eliminate 
child labour and all forms of modern slavery from the 
cocoa sector. Some international buyers, pressured 
by the NGOs, media and consumer organisations 
are now playing pivotal roles in the development of 
national certification schemes, with a focus on labour 
practices (Ton et al. 2008).
In the marketing segment of the value chain, the 
state-supported PBC is still the major cocoa 
purchasing company, purchasing about 30 per cent 
of the total annual cocoa output. The PBC was partly 
privatised some years ago, with COCOBOD being 
the company’s major shareholder (Ton et al. 2008). 
Since the liberalisation, a greater proportion of the 
30 LBCs operating in the sector were Ghanaian, 
with only two (i.e. Olam and Armajaro) being foreign-
owned. One of the LBCs (i.e. Kuapa Kokoo Union) was 
owned by farmers and was created with the support 
of international NGOs (Ton et al. 2008). This means 
that farmers’ role in the cocoa marketing segment is 
still very limited. Farmers have still been selling their 
cocoa to LBCs at a guaranteed nationwide price fixed 
by the government. The LBCs transport the cocoa 
they buy to ‘takeover points’ to sell at a fixed price 
to the COCOBOD, which is responsible for exporting 
cocoa beans (Laven and Boomsma 2012). The state-
owned COCOBOD still controls the cocoa industry 
through its subsidiaries: CMC, Cocoa Quality Control 
Company (QCC), CRIG, SPD, and CHED (Amanor 
2020) COCOBOD has managed to stabilise the cocoa 
prices, while relying on the Quality Control Company 
to consistently supply good quality cocoa, for which 
it received a premium on the world market (Kolavalli 
and Vigneri 2017; Ton et al. 2008). Given that all LBCs 
purchase cocoa at nationally fixed prices, farmers do 
not benefit from the differential pricing that goes with 
complete liberalisation. However, as a way of enticing 
farmers to sell cocoa to them, some LBCs offer farmers 
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complementary services and inputs in order to build 
trust and social capital. LBCs are given a yearly fixed 
‘buyers-margin’ which is set by the government. The 
LBCs rely on this margin to pay their purchasing clerks 
on commission basis, and this motivates them to buy 
more cocoa. While LBCs were initially given permission 
to export up to 30 per cent of the cocoa they purchase, 
this practice was discontinued in 2007 on the grounds 
that the current system is better at ensuring high 
quality of cocoa. LBCs are unhappy about such a total 
control of the cocoa export sector by COCOBOD, but 
they lack the holding power to openly complain about 
this and other issues related to their relationships with 
COCOBOD, for fears that such complaints will create 
tensions between them and COCOBOD, as highlighted 
in the statement below by an official of one of the LBCs:
"There are some challenges here and there. If you 
look at the sector, we would have liked to directly do 
more export just as businessmen can export other 
crops. You know in the trade sector, it is the export 
part that one can get huge profits. However, there 
are some restrictions now….We try our own ways 
to manage our frustrations without complaining 
so much about the restrictions imposed by 
COCOBOD. You know it always has the support 
of the government and its leadership changes any 
time there is a new government. So if any cocoa 
buying company confronts them [COCOBOD] on 
any issues, they can even stop that company from 
operating in the sector."
The above statement shows that unequal power 
relations between COCOBOD and LBCs make it 
difficult for the latter to challenge the monopoly that 
COCOBOD has over the internal and market of cocoa. 
The statement also demonstrates how COCOBOD’s 
leadership is usually linked with the ruling government. 
Given that the ruling government appoints members 
of the management board of COCOBOD, successive 
ruling governments have been using COCOBOD 
as a tool to create and distribute rents in the cocoa 
sector. Indeed, there have been complaints by the 
opposition parties about high level of corruption 
and state capture perpetuated by some officials of 
COCOBOD. Meanwhile the ruling governments have 
so far been able to employ policy ambiguities to 
maintain autonomy and contest donor pressure for 
complete liberalisation of cocoa export sector. The 
ruling governments have often argued that the current 
role of COCOBOD helps to maintain high quality of 
Ghana’s cocoa. Also, the discontinuation of the plan 
to allow some LBCs to export cocoa was justified by 
the supposed unreadiness of LBCs. As Grainger and 
Konteh (2007) noted, the executive may intentionally 
use deception and policy ambiguity to handle demands 
from powerful actors, such as international donors. 
Given that the rational for allowing COCOBOD to 
control the cocoa marketing segment is linked to rent 
distribution opportunities rather than political ideology 
of the ruling government, both the NPP and National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) governments are not in 
favour of complete liberalisation.
It is also important to state that although the 
government continues to fix the cocoa prices annually, 
prices offered to farmers since 2000 has been stable, 
as both the NDC and the NPP, which have governed 
Ghana since the re-introduction of democracy in 1992, 
have been using cocoa pricing to solicit political votes 
from farmers. The ruling governments have particularly 
been increasing the cocoa producer prices in the years 
preceding election and or within the election year. For 
instance, the cocoa producer price was increased 
by 81.5 per cent in the year 2008 which was an 
election year and 62 per cent in 2015/2016 which is 
a year preceding and election year. The percentage of 
increase in producer prices in non-election years have 
always been extremely low (Teye and Torvikey 2018). 
Similarly, even though the cocoa sector has been 
liberalised, subsidies on fertilisers and agrochemicals 
have become a key political tool for ‘buying’ votes in 
since 2000. This situation emerged during the 2000 
elections, when the NPP, which was then the main 
opposition party, promised to re-introduce fertiliser 
subsidies if voted to power. In fulfilment of its campaign 
promises, the NPP Government re-introduced fertiliser 
subsidy programmes for all smallholder farmers in 
July 2008. Many cocoa farmers in Ghana continue to 
benefit from these fertiliser subsidy programmes. Teye 
and Torvikey (2018) have demonstrated that the amount 
of money that the state spends on fertiliser subsidies 
tend to increase significantly during election years, and 
this indicates that the policy is being used to solicit 
votes from farmers. The ‘cocoa politics’ also entails 
free mass spraying of agro-chemicals, which was 
introduced by the NPP in 2001 to control cocoa pests 
and diseases. Both the NDC and NPP governments 
talk about free mass spraying and input subsidies 
during electioneering campaigns. As indicated by an 
elderly farmer who was interviewed as part of this 
study, farmers are the winners of these cocoa politics 
as it enables them to get subsidies:
“The political competition between NDC and NPP 
has really helped us [farmers]. We [farmers] used 
to get fertilisers almost free of charge before JJ 
[Rawlings] came to remove all the subsidies. For 
several years, we did not get anything from the 
government. Even the cocoa price fell drastically. In 
some years, we had to carry cocoa in the night to 
the Ivory Coast border to sell because cocoa prices 
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in Ghana were very low... Now farmers are getting 
some support with fertiliser subsidies and even 
free chemicals to spray the cocoa farms because 
the government [officials] know we will vote against 
them, if we don’t get fertilisers.”
The above statement clearly shows how democratisation 
has increased the holding power of cocoa farmers and 
increased their access to subsidised fertilisers. These 
findings support the assertion of Chinsinga and Poulton 
(2014) that a government may support smallholder 
farmers if it believes that such actions enhance its 
chances of remaining in power. It needs to be explained 
that, in reality, the management of fertiliser subsidy policy 
is high-jacked by ruling governments to create rents for 
its crony capitalists (mainly Ghanaian entrepreneurs). 
Under both the NDC and NPP governments, research 
commissioned by the Peasant Farmers Association 
of Ghana have shown that contracts for the supply of 
subsidised fertilisers, and other inputs, are awarded to 
supporters of the ruling governments. In some cases, 
poor quality fertilisers are provided by such party 
contractors (Teye and Torvikey 2018). There were also 
allegations in the media that in some cases contracts for 
supplying subsidised inputs have been signed between 
the government and its crony capitalists and millions of 
cedis have been paid to the capitalists, but the goods 
paid for (e.g. fertilisers) have never been fully supplied. 
Similarly, both the NDC and NPP governments have 
used farm mechanisation programmes to reward 
political supporters as subsidised tractors and other 
equipment, for instance, have usually been given to 
party supporters. Given that a significant proportion of 
the funding in agricultural sector is provided by donors 
(Teye and Torvikey 2018), one can argue the financial 
grants provided by donors to support smallholder 
farmers are partly being used by ruling governments to 
fund their patronage networks and remain in power. The 
situation resonates with the argument by Collier and 
Dollar (1999) that financial aid, when poorly coordinated, 
allows governments of developing countries to finance 
neo-patrimonial networks and hold on to power.
Since 2000, the cocoa processing segment has also 
been extensively liberalised, and a number of domestic 
and international actors have invested in the sector. 
For instance, Barry Callebaut, the world’s third largest 
processing firm, has a processing factory operating 
with a capacity of 75,000t. Apart from the large-scale 
multilateral companies, some Ghanaians have invested 
in this segment and produce cocoa products for the 
Ghanaian market. One case that we came across 
during this study was that of Adubam, a 51-year-old 
Ghanaian woman, who returned to Ghana after 12 
years of residence in the UK. While in the UK, she 
worked in a cocoa company where she acquired some 
skills in cocoa processing. She returned to Ghana and 
used the skills and money acquired from the UK to set 
up her processing company in Accra, which has six 
full time employees and several casual workers. She 
explained her motivations for coming back to invest in 
the cocoa sector in the following words:
"I was residing in UK where I worked in a cocoa 
company for a while. After acquiring all the 
experience, I told myself it was to return to Ghana 
to set up a cocoa processing company because, 
after all, the cocoa is produced in Ghana. So I came 
down with the little money I made there to start 
my own company. The company was established 
about 12 years ago and it is fully registered. We 
are into manufacturing and packaging of cocoa 
products for the public, both here and abroad. We 
also produce customised chocolate for institutions." 
Similar to the case above, Nana Tura, a 55-year-old 
Ghanaian, reported that he established his cocoa 
processing company, which has so far employed 14 
people. Nana Tura explained that he started as a cocoa 
farmer several years ago, and has now invested his 
savings from the sale of cocoa into the establishment 
of the processing factory:
“I have been producing cocoa for several years. A 
few years ago, I decided to use the money I had 
saved all these years to set up this factory, and I 
am happy that things have worked for me… In my 
factory, we are currently processing only cocoa 
from my own farms. This good because the income 
from the sale of cocoa products is much higher 
than the income from the sale of cocoa beans. 
Also, with the factory, I get regular income as we 
sell the processed goods throughout the year, 
unlike the cocoa beans that we could only sell 
during the harvest time.”
Nana Tura’s case is an example of ‘stepping out’ 
livelihood strategy, as savings accumulated from the 
production of cocoa was used as capital for moving 
into cocoa processing and marketing. His investment 
into processing provides him stable returns. The 
establishment of small-scale agro-processing firms 
is being actively promoted as part of the current NPP 
government’s industrialisation initiative, referred to as 
One-District, One-Factory programme.
4.5. Social difference in the cocoa value 
chain
The preceding discussion clearly shows that significant 
social differences exist across the entire cocoa value 
chain. There is a ‘vertical social differentiation’ as 
actors in the production segment, mainly farmers 
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and farm labourers, are generally poorer than actors 
in the marketing and processing segments. As 
stated already, while market concentration increases 
the bargaining power of traders and processors, 
and allows them to make huge profits, smallholder 
farmers are poor because they are often “price 
takers” (Callahan 2019). While employees in the 
marketing and processing segment work for formal 
organisations, which offer higher and more regular 
salaries or commissions, about 80 per cent of cocoa 
producers are smallholder farmers, considered to 
be self-employed. Employment and labour relations, 
even in many of the large-scale agribusinesses in 
the production segment, are highly informal, with 
low and irregular wages. The high level of poverty 
among cocoa farmers has, historically, been a source 
of worry to many policymakers and development 
partners (Amoah 1995). Some researchers and policy 
analysts attribute high incidence of poverty in the 
sector to internal and cultural factors, including tenure 
relations, small farm sizes and lack of technological 
innovations (Odijie 2018; Amoah 1995). However, 
other researchers attribute poverty to deep structural 
inequalities within the global cocoa industry, resulting 
from the domination of the industry by a few 
transnational corporations (Amanor et al. 2020; Pilling 
2019). In recent years, the governments of Ghana and 
Côte D’Ivoire have asserted that low world market 
prices of cocoa is a major cause of poverty among 
cocoa farmers. The president of Ghana, Nana Akuffo 
Addo, recently stated that “Chocolate is a US$100bn 
industry and we [Ghana and Côte D’Ivoire] who 
produce 65 per cent of the raw material make less 
than US$6bn from the sweat and toil of our farmers” 
(Pilling 2019: 1). In 2019, the governments of Ghana 
and Cote d’Ivoire threatened to suspend sales of the 
2020/21 cocoa harvest to buyers who are not willing 
to offer higher prices (Amanor et al. 2020). As shown 
in the statement below, farmers attributed their 
economic challenges to low cocoa prices, unreliable 
rainfall and diseases:
“We are poor because the price of the cocoa is low, 
and the government does not increase it except 
when it is time for elections…These days the rainfall 
regime is also not reliable. This affects our harvest. 
Diseases are also worrying us so in some years 
we don’t get good harvest and all these problems 
make us poor.” 
Apart from the ‘vertical social differentiation’, there 
are significant horizontal social differences between 
actors even within the same segment of the value 
chain. Much of the social differentiation occurs at the 
production segment, as a result of differences in scale 
of production, age, gender, and migration status. With 
regards to scale of production, large-scale cocoa 
farmers tend to be wealthier and have better chances 
of receiving technical and financial support from both 
the government and the private sector than smallholder 
farmers. Mr Aluva, who is now a large-scale cocoa 
farmer, told us that when he started farming cocoa 22 
years ago, all his attempts to get credit from the financial 
institutions failed. He further explained that now that 
he is a ‘big farmer’ the same financial institutions are 
willing to give him loans: 
“When I started [farming], it was not easy at all. 
I was working in Tema for 11 years and we were 
given money by the employer and asked to go 
home. My wife and I decided to come to this 
community to farm, as my uncle was already here. 
Things became difficult, so I went to some banks 
for loan, but I didn’t get any support. A friend 
working in Tarkwa later introduced me to small-
scale [gold] mining. So I was combining this with 
farming… Now that I am a ‘big farmer, the banks 
are rather calling me to come for loans. So in this 
country, it is difficult for young farmers to get loan 
but the established farmers rather get support."   
As clearly explained in the above statement, young 
farmers struggle to get sizeable financial grants because 
they generally do not have assets to serve as collateral. 
Young farmers also find it difficult to access farming 
land which is largely controlled by traditional authorities 
and family heads. As Amanor et al. (2020) noted, the 
youth are increasingly dependent upon elders for land, 
while elders compete among themselves for control of 
land. Consequently, many young persons are reluctant 
to work in the cocoa production sector. A recent 
study by Lowe (2017) indicates that cocoa farmers are 
ageing, with an average age of 50 years. Our interviews 
indicated that, apart from lack of credit and land 
scarcity, other reasons why young people are unwilling 
to engage in cocoa production include the perception 
that farmers are poor, and reluctance of young people 
to live in rural areas. As noted already, since 2016, NGOs 
and the government have implemented programmes 
aimed at equipping the youth with skills and resources 
necessary to effectively participate in the cocoa value 
chain. However, these programmes, including Planting 
for Food and Jobs, have not significantly brought about 
improved wellbeing of smallholder farmers and other 
vulnerable groups in the agricultural sector.
There are also social differentials which are related to 
migration status. While migrant labour has historically 
contributed significantly to the development of the 
cocoa industry in Ghana (Amanor et al. 2020), migrant 
cocoa farmers face various challenges, especially in 
their efforts to access land. Migrant farmers are more 
likely to adopt share-cropping system than native 
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farmers. Such share-cropping arrangements make 
migrant farmers poorer, as they share the produce 
or cocoa income with the landlord. Additionally, 
migrant farmers who have bought lands that belong 
to communities from traditional authorities in some of 
the cocoa growing areas in Western and Brong Ahafo 
regions are required to pay an amount equivalent to 10 
per cent of their annual cocoa output to the traditional 
authorities as royalties. There is also a degree of 
intersection between migration status and ethnicity. As 
the cocoa growing zone is traditionally the home of the 
Akan ethnic group, Akan farmers tend to be wealthier, 
due to increased access to lands, than non-Akan 
settler farmers or labourers. A majority of cocoa farm 
labourers are internal migrants from poor communities 
in the Northern savannah region or migrants from 
Togo, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. 
Differences between gender groups are also significant 
in the sector. Even though both men and women work 
on cocoa farms, only a small proportion of women 
have their own cocoa farms. This is due to the fact that 
many male cocoa farmers tend to depend on wives 
and children for labour, and this limits the access of 
women to their own land. While 40 per cent of the work 
on cocoa farms is done by women, they own only 2 per 
cent of the land (Cocoa Life 2020). Also, as a result of 
patriarchal inheritance systems, women generally do 
not have access to land. When such women work with 
their husbands on family farms, only the husbands are 
regarded as owners of the farm. Similar to the situation 
reported by Yaro et al. (2017) in their assessment of 
labour relations on mango farms in Ghana, we found 
that there were situations where both men, and their 
wives, started working on cocoa farms. However, once 
the farms became larger and the men also became 
wealthier, the women were locked out of the family 
cocoa business. In some cases, such women were 
asked to concentrate on the production of food crops 
or engage in trading activities. For instance, even 
though Mr Aluva and his wife jointly worked on the farm 
for several years when he was poor, the wife, Madam 
Adjorgu, told us that she was no longer actively involved 
the management of the farm. The husband now hires 
labourers to do everything on the farm and she has 
even been prevented from visiting the farms: 
“When we started farming, we worked together and 
ate in the same bowl on the farm. Even when things 
were not working and he went to Obousi to engage 
in gold mining, I was working on the farms. Since 
the farms expanded and he became a rich man, 
he does not give me any chance to know what is 
happening on the farms. He said I should engage 
in trading, but in this village trading is not lucrative.”
These forms of marginalisation appear to be widespread 
in the cocoa sector. According to Cocoa Life (2020), 
female cocoa farmers earn 25–30 per cent less than 
male farmers in Ghana. Female cocoa farmers also 
do not have access to training that can help them 
understand how to gain autonomy in their households 
and community. The women also tend to face several 
obstacles in their efforts to access finance and farm 
inputs. In view of these challenges, the Cocoa Life 
partnership and other public-private partnership projects 
are seeking to empower women in cocoa growing areas 
by enhancing their access to farm inputs and training 
them. The outcomes of these programmes have not 
yet yielded satisfactory results, as they are affected by 
structured inequalities in such patriarchal societies. 
Our assessment also indicates that the employment 
and labour relations on cocoa farms are undergoing 
changes, due to intra-household conflicts. While sons 
and wives continue to provide free labour services on 
some farms owned by men, there were cases whereby 
sons and wives were either charging for their services 
or were working on their separate farms. For instance, 
Madam Ayuma had her separate cocoa farm, while her 
husband also had his own farm. She explained that 
occasionally she accompanies her husband to his 
farm, especially during the cocoa harvesting period. 
The husband also occasionally visits her farm but, in 
most cases, they work independently on their farm. 
Her two sons also have their own farms in the same 
community. She explained that if the sons work for 
their father, the father pays them just as he will pay 
other people. Ayuma noted that she and the sons are 
working on their separate farms because as a result 
of the matrilineal inheritance system, they fear that her 
husband’s nephews will come and take over his cocoa 
farms when he dies one day:
“In the past we were all working on his farms, but 
now we are working on our own farms… We are 
afraid that if he dies now, his nephews will come 
and take over his farms and we will not have 
anything. We have seen a lot of disputes over farms 
when the owner dies and their relatives came to 
take control… He helped our sons to get the land 
but everything is in their names and he pays them 
when they work for him, which they also use to 
develop their own farms.”
The statement above is consistent with the assertion of 
Amanor et al. (2020) that, as a result of ejection of wives 
and sons from their deceased husbands and fathers’ 
farms by powerful matrilineal relations, many wives and 
sons now seek to gain access to land through routes 
other than helping lineage relatives in exchange for 
expectations of future access to land. This has affected 
the supply of free labour to some cocoa farmers. 
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Interviews with key informants and some farmers also 
indicate that there are differential impacts of expansion 
of cocoa farms on different actors. Similar to findings of 
Yaro et al. (2017) in the Mango farming areas of Ghana, 
the poor are largely not represented as owners of land 
but rather as farm labourers. While many cocoa farmers 
have not been forcibly dispossessed of their lands, 
traditional authorities and family heads sometimes 
take lands being used by poor migrants for food crop 
production and give them to more wealthy cocoa 
farmers. This is because there are better financial gains 
from the new leases for commercial agriculture than from 
sharecropping. Poor migrants who used to cultivate food 
crops under share-cropping arrangements, and women 
who use to cultivate food crops on family lands, are 
particularly finding it difficult to access lands, which are 
now generally being converted into permanent cocoa 
farms. In some cases, weaker family members and 
community members, usually women, who do not have 
power to defend their entitlements, have lost their lands 
to traditional authorities and family heads who sold such 
lands to wealthy farmers. These findings clearly show 
that the youth and women in agriculture empowerment 
programmes being jointly implemented by the private 
sector, government, international development partners, 
and NGOs, have not been able to significantly improve 
the wellbeing of the youth, women and migrant groups 
in agriculture, due to customary land tenure systems 
and patriarchal traditions.  
Expansion of the cocoa industry also has adverse 
effects on food security in some cocoa growing 
areas. Given the general scarcity of land and the 
fact that traditional authorities expect 10 per cent of 
the value of cocoa in some communities, they resell 
land that has been given to farmers but has not been 
developed into cocoa farms. In order protect their 
lands, migrant farmers sometimes end up developing 
the entire land into cocoa farms, but therefore lack 
land for food production. Additionally, food insecurity 
is caused by the transfer of land under food crop 
production to wealthy cocoa farmers. Meanwhile, 
a ‘market route to food security’, whereby farmers 
could use cash from sale of cocoa to buy all food 
from the market, does not work because many of the 
smallholder farmers are quite poor and cannot afford 
to buy food for their large families.
4.6. Challenges with the cocoa value 
chain in Ghana
As highlighted already, all segments of Ghana’s cocoa 
value chain are confronted with challenges that could 
significantly impact the sustainable delivery of cocoa 
to both domestic and international markets. To 
begin with, the growing pressure on land, alongside 
traditional tenurial arrangements, in which many 
smallholder cocoa farmers lack clear rights and land 
titles, contributes to reduced productivity (Callahan 
2019; Yaro et al. 2018; Asamoah and Owusu-Ansah 
2017). The unavailability of labour, and the resulting 
high cost of hiring labourers, also affects cocoa 
production. The cost of farm labour has increased 
partly because of the growing pace of rural-urban 
migration of young people (Barrientos and Asenso-
Okyere 2009). As indicated by a farmer below, there 
is a perception that the Free Senior High School 
policy introduced by the NPP government in 2017 has 
worsened the labour supply situation: 
"It is now very difficult than before to get young men 
to work on our farms because many of them have 
taken advantage of the Free Secondary School 
policy and have gone to school." 
A lack of available labour also partly contributed to 
the use of children on cocoa farms (Barrientos et al. 
2008). Cocoa production in Ghana is also significantly 
challenged by pests and diseases such as mistletoe, 
capsid (insect), and black pod (fungus) (Bymolt et al. 
2018; Kongor et al. 2017), which require timely spraying 
to mitigate their effects on crop losses estimated to 
reach about 30 per cent of annual cocoa production in 
some cases (Takyi et al. 2019). Lack of access to inputs, 
especially fertilisers and agro-chemicals, also affects 
cocoa production. Even with the introduction of mass 
spraying by COCOBOD, farmers still complain about 
the poor management of the spraying programme, as 
some sprayers engage in corrupt practices, such as 
illegally selling chemical consignments in neighbouring 
countries and spraying with ineffective solutions (World 
Bank 2017; Barrientos et al. 2008).
Climate change is also affecting cocoa production 
in Ghana. For instance, the relatively low harvests of 
2014 and 2015 have been blamed on natural shocks 
amplified by the El Niño phenomenon, as well as 
excessively high temperatures and inadequate rainfall 
(Joerin et al. 2018). An alarming econometric analysis 
indicates that over 90 per cent of cocoa farmers 
have already been exposed to the adverse impacts 
of climate change, with severe implications for cocoa 
production and rural livelihoods (Afriyie-Kraft et al. 
2020). Manifestations of the effects of climate change 
on cocoa farms are observable in the amplified 
prevalence of pest and diseases, wilting cocoa leaves, 
and high cocoa seedling mortality, which result in low 
yields (Asante et al. 2017). 
Access to capital is another serious challenge in the 
cocoa sector. Prior to reforms in the cocoa sector, 
the PBC supported farmers with cash advances 
and recovered the money when cocoa was sold. 
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Following liberalisation, the LBCs have found it difficult 
to support this arrangement (Barrientos et al. 2008). 
Consequently, farmers fall on several other informal 
financing schemes including high interest loans from 
money lenders with their farms as collateral which are 
less dependable (Dabone et al. 2014; Barrientos and 
Asenso-Okyere 2009). Female farmers, in particular, 
tend to be disadvantaged by these factors and are 
therefore more likely to lack access to credit. 
While the internal marketing segment is better organised 
compared with the 1970s, when the marketing system 
nearly collapsed, some cocoa farmers complained 
about low prices of cocoa beans. The monopoly 
enjoyed by COCOBOD and patronage networks 
between COCOBOD officials and the government also 
affects the performance of the cocoa value chain. On 
the other hand, the Government of Ghana believes that 
the world market cocoa price is quite low.
A key challenge among processors is the constrained 
supply of the cheaper light crop from COCOBOD, 
resulting in price fluctuation and keen competition with 
wealthier processors offering COCOBOD attractive 
terms for priority consideration (Roldan et al. 2013). 
Moreover, locally-owned processors are often cash-
strapped and lack access to low-cost finance (Abbadi 
et al. 2019). Additionally, the cost and reliability of 
power supply has been a source of significant concern 
among local processors, as they must often generate 
their own power at a prohibitive cost to their operations.
4.6.4. Impact of COVID-19 on the cocoa 
value chain
Ghana has the second highest number of reported 
COVID-19 cases in West Africa, although COVID-19 
related death rate has been quite low. Many of the 
restrictions on public gatherings, which were imposed 
by the government of Ghana on 15 March 2020, a 
few days after Ghana recorded its first two COVID-19 
cases, have been eased. The closure of all Ghanaian 
land, sea and air borders, which took effect from 21 
March 2020, is also still in force at the time of writing in 
March 2021. A partial lockdown, which the government 
imposed on the Greater Accra and the Greater Kumasi 
Metropolitan Areas, effective 30 March 2020 to reduce 
the spread of the coronavirus, was lifted on 20 April 
2020. In this section, we discuss the effects of the health 
and safety measures and the restrictions implemented 
globally to contain the disease by public health officials 
on the cocoa value chain. The assessment shows that 
the pandemic affected labour supply and demand; 
input and raw material supply; transportation and 
distribution of cocoa beans and cocoa products; 
access to markets; and health and safety practices.
Labour supply and demand 
The COVID-19 related disruptions affected both labour 
supply and demand. With regards to labour supply, 
managers of a few agribusinesses at all segments of 
the cocoa value chain reported that some employees 
were reluctant to come to work for fears that they could 
be infected, as highlighted in the statement below by a 
cocoa purchasing clerk:
“There have been instances where some workers 
did not come to work because they were scared 
of working in groups. Some workers also come 
to work but do feel reluctant to work in groups 
due to the fear of contracting COVID-19. This has 
slowed the work in some circumstances (Boni, 
purchasing clerk)."
A farmer also reported that the pandemic affected farm 
labour supply, as both the labourers and the farmers 
were not comfortable working with each other. It was 
also explained that the border closures have affected 
the supply of migrant labour, and this has contributed 
to increased cost of labour: 
“As a result of COVID-19, accessing labourers 
has become difficult because they fear to go to 
other people’s farms, while we also fear to bring 
them to our farms. Migrant farm labourers from 
neighbouring countries also can’t come to Ghana 
due to the border closures. The situation has led 
to an increase in the daily wage for labourers from 
GH¢30.00 to GH¢40.00.” (Tlala, farmer)
On the other hand, some agribusinesses have also 
reduced their demand for labour in order to observe 
health and safety protocols. For instance, a manager 
of one of the firms responsible for marketing cocoa 
and cocoa products indicated how they have cut 
employee numbers:
“We have reduced numbers of employees by about 
59 per cent in order to abide by safety protocols 
that were put in place by the government.”
Similarly, some firms involved in the purchasing of cocoa 
or cocoa processing reported that they have reduced 
the number of employees, and also introduced shifts to 
ensure safety of workers:
“Labour supply within the business was reduced in 
order to observe safety protocols. Sometimes the 
workers run shifts [some stay home while others 
work] since we don’t want them to be so close to 
each other.” (Herii, cocoa purchasing clerk)
“We undertook staff retrenchment. This was 
a painful decision for us looking at the current 
situation…Some staff also left voluntarily because 
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production has been low and revenue generation 
has been affected. This goes a long way to affect 
the salaries of staff. It has not been easy for us, 
but we are doing our best to keep the few who 
are willing to stay and support at this difficult time” 
(Nana Tura, CEO of a cocoa processing company).
It is evident from the statement of Nana Tura that 
workers’ salaries have been reduced while others h. 
This was a common response adopted by many small-
scale businesses in Ghana. In some cases, the small-
scale businesses closed down altogether: 
“Employees had to stay home because I do 
not want to risk their lives. So for now we have 
stopped production.” (Adubam, Cocoa processing 
company)
As noted below, by a respondent from an input 
distribution company, there were also situations where 
employees were working, but their salaries were not 
paid regularly, due to low sales:  
“Labour supply has not been affected much as 
people still want to work. However, it has been 
difficult paying my employees their monthly salaries 
since the start of COVID-19. This is because sales 
have been very low during this period.” (Indodo, 
input distributor)
The above situation shows how both employers and 
employees have been struggling to deal with the 
disruptions. Some of our interviewees told us that in 
some cases, the employee agree to work without full 
pay in anticipation that the situation will improve.
Inability to access input and raw material 
The COVID-19 pandemic also seriously affected 
farmers’ access to input, especially agro-chemicals 
and fertilisers. According to some farmers, the state 
supported input distribution agencies were not working 
during the lockdown period which coincided with the 
period they needed to spray their cocoa farms and 
apply fertilisers:
“This is the time we normally spray the farms. 
I am the leader of the community association 
which will take delivery of the chemicals and we 
have been waiting for the agency to bring our 
chemicals, but we have heard that they are not 
coming now because of the disease [COVID-19].” 
(Luty, cocoa farmer)
On the other hand, an input dealer reported that 
farmers generally do not want to travel to urban areas 
to buy input for fear of being infected:
“Patronage has been very low since COVID-19 
started. Only few farmers come in to buy, compared 
to period before COVID-19. This is because people 
are being advised to stay home.”
Similar to the situation of the farmers, some of the 
cocoa processing companies who depend on 
imported materials for packaging reported that, due to 
the closure of the borders, they were unable to access 
materials for packaging their products. They have, 
however, been managing the situation by relying on 
locally available packaging materials:
“Most of the material we use for packaging is 
imported and so we are unable even to obtain them 
because of the closure of our borders.” (Adubam, 
manager of a cocoa processing Company)
“We have reduced our reliance on imported 
packaging items, for example pouch paper 
bags, which are difficult to access due to supply 
challenges. We have improvised with locally 
available packaging option.” (Nana Tura, CEO of a 
cocoa processing company)
While lack of access to imported packaging materials is 
a challenge, the situation is also offering opportunities 
for companies to explore the use of local raw materials 
to create new packaging.
Challenges with transportation 
The lockdown associated with COVID-19 also made 
it difficult for cocoa purchasing clerks to convey 
their purchases to the warehouses. Even though 
the transportation of food items was exempted from 
the lockdown, some of the drivers were unwilling to 
transport the goods to urban areas for fear of being 
infected. In some instances, the warehouses were 
full because of the closure of borders which affected 
onward shipment of the cocoa to the international 
market. These challenges are highlighted in the 
statement below: 
“Although I don’t personally sell cocoa beans, we 
are supposed to transport them to warehouses. 
However, due to the fear of the pandemic, 
some drivers that usually transport the cocoa 
for me were initially not willing to go [to Accra 
and Kumasi] and the lockdown also affected 
transportation of the cocoa, since drivers did 
not want to go to Accra and Kumasi which were 
under lockdown.” (Bobi, purchasing clerk)
“Transportation was a major issue since some 
transport drivers did not work initially. So 
farmers in some communities could not bring 
their cocoa beans here [shed where farmers 
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sell cocoa] for sale. During the lockdown, we 
also found it difficult conveying cocoa to Accra 
as some drivers refused to carry cocoa due to 
the lockdown in Accra and Kumasi……… Due 
to the lockdown and initial closure of the port, 
it was difficult transporting the produce to the 
ports for on-ward shipment to markets. In some 
instances the warehouses were full because of 
this problem.” (Herii, purchasing clerk)
The transportation challenges that affected purchasing 
clerks who work at places where farmers sell cocoa 
also affected some input distributers. Input dealers 
who obtained their supplies from Accra reported that 
some of their drivers could not go to Accra for new 
stock. In all cases, drivers charged higher prices during 
the lockdown.
Access to markets and distribution of 
products
The lockdown also seriously affected access to 
international markets and distribution of processed 
cocoa products. The cocoa processing companies 
noted that the closure of the borders made it difficult 
to transport their goods to other African countries, 
although in principle, food items to be allowed to 
cross the borders. The distribution of products 
within Ghana was also affected, as many people 
remained at home and did not go out to purchase 
items. As shown in the statement below, a major 
cocoa processing company reported that sales 
declined by 40 per cent during the lockdown.
“During the lockdown, it became quite difficult 
to export our products to some countries due to 
border closures and restrictions on movements. 
The local demand for cocoa products in Ghana 
also was generally affected by the lockdown, 
as many people stayed at home. The loss of 
jobs and associated economic hardships due 
to COVID-19 might have also contributed to 
reduction in sales, which dropped by about 40 
per cent." (Nagatha, cocoa processing company) 
The pandemic and associated lockdown also 
affected the implementation of marketing and product 
promotion campaigns by some of the companies. For 
instance, one company reported that it was forced to 
cancel all sale promotion exhibitions due to restrictions: 
“Most of the monthly pop-up markets where we sell 
our products were cancelled. Some distributors 
who wholesale our products were also affected 
by this, and faced reduced demand leading to 
them to cancel orders. A large expo [exhibition] 
which we were due to hold this year [2020] has 
to be postponed to early next year. We were just 
about to commence an export drive with one 
large international order, but this was cancelled. 
Other ongoing discussions regarding export are 
all on hold. We find ourselves unable to access 
any foreign markets because borders are closed.” 
(Nana Tura, CEO of a cocoa processing company)
Health and safety concerns and practices
In order to deal with COVID-19 health and safety 
concerns, many of the business enterprises adopted 
various health and safety practices. These include 
provision of handwashing facilities, observing social 
distancing protocols at work place, running of shifts, and 
asking some staff to work from home, among others: 
“In line with the COVID-19 management protocols 
outlined by the government, we have put in several 
measures to protect our workers and customers. 
The wearing of masks is now mandatory. We have 
also provided sanitisers, water and soap for staff 
to wash their hands regularly. To practice social 
distancing and in line with government’s workers 
rationalisation, the administrative staff has been 
halved and many people now work from home. 
Although we were exempted from restrictions 
during the lockdown, the technical staff, which was 
already divided into shifts, operated under strict 
health and safety protocols.” (Nagatha, cocoa 
processing company)
“Our operations have changed because of the 
COVID-19. In response, we have emphasised 
hand washing and checking regularly on workers’ 
health. An additional hand washing stations at 
our processing site has been provided. We have 
also revised the layout of the production area to 
incorporate appropriate distancing protocols.” 
(Nana Tura, cocoa processing company) 
“Compulsory wearing of masks has been instituted 
to help curb the spread of COVID-19…Also, constant 
using of sanitisers and washing of hands is in place. 
We also advise the workers not to sit or stand close 
to each other when working. However, doing these 
things is very difficult due to the nature of the work. 
If they are loading for, instance, it is impossible to 
practice social distancing. Some workers do not 
adhere to the safety measures, hence the risky 
nature of the job.” (Boni, purchasing clerk)
The introduction of more health and safety protocols at 
many work places is not a bad initiative, but some of 
the respondents talked about the financial challenges 
associated with such protocols. As indicated by Boni in 
the statement above, it is also practically more difficult for 
those in the cocoa purchasing and packing segment to 
practice social distancing due to the nature of their work.
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The analysis in this paper has shown that institutional 
arrangements and policies implemented in Ghana’s 
cocoa value chain have gone through several 
alterations in relation to changing agrarian political 
economy and distribution of power among various 
interest groups. These groups include the political 
elite, traditional authorities, farmers, international 
buyers, and international donors. As cocoa is the 
most important cash crop in Ghana, the government 
has a stake in retaining control over cocoa earnings 
for the purpose of raising revenue for development 
projects and funding its neo-patrimonial networks that 
are important for remaining in power. Consistent with 
the political settlement framework (Khan 2018), the 
interaction by the various interest groups, with different 
sources of holding power, has led to the evolution of 
policies and institutional arrangements which have 
created different costs and benefits (rents) for different 
interest groups in the cocoa sector. 
The history of the corporate governance system in 
the cocoa sector went through four periods. The first 
period (1920–1957) was the colonial era which was 
characterised by a fairly corporate governance system 
and struggle between European traders and farmer 
cooperatives for monopoly over internal marketing 
of cocoa. The second period (1957–1980) was the 
early post-independence era with a state-controlled 
economy, characterised by neopatrimonialism. While 
stabilisation of cocoa prices was used to justify the 
creation of a state-controlled marketing board, the 
post-independence governments generally exploited 
farmers and used cocoa revenue to support patronage 
networks which would enable them to remain in power. 
According to van de Walle (2001), the structure of neo-
patrimonial networks entails the “ins”, the “outs” and 
the government. The government taxes the “outs”, 
and to get financial resources for providing patronage 
to the “ins”. Farmers in rural areas tend to suffer the 
“outs” because they are not well-organised and cannot 
contest the ruling government. Marketing boards are 
used to tax farmers in rural areas to raise money to 
fund urban consumption and fund neopatrimonialism 
networks (Teye 2008). This is exactly what happened 
during the early postcolonial period. Cocoa farmers 
were over-taxed, and yet, the cocoa rent distribution 
only favoured the ruling elite and their clients. The 
effects of neopatrimonialism nearly led to the collapse 
of the cocoa value chain.
The third period (1980–2000) marks the introduction 
of economic reforms and liberalisation which were 
adopted in response to international pressure and 
economic crisis. The institutional changes and 
heavy investments in the production and processing 
segments helped to revive the cocoa sector. However, 
while the reforms brought about a gradual increased 
in producer prices, it also contributed to rising 
costs of production to farmers as subsidies were 
removed. Again, even though ERPs and SAPs helped 
to revive the economy, they also provided financial 
resources, or what Gibson and Hoffman (2002) term 
“patronage resources” for the PNDC government. 
Most of the loans and grants given to Ghana for 
cocoa sector rehabilitation went into the hands 
of private businessmen with close ties with state 
officials (see Teye 2008). The fourth period (2000–
present) is characterised by further liberalisation and 
public-private partnerships, involving both traditional 
and new development partners, and geared 
towards modernisation of cocoa farming, promotion 
of environmentally friendly farming activities, 
empowerment of women and youth to participate 
in the cocoa value chain, protecting the rights of 
children and funding community development 
projects in cocoa growing areas. In reality, however, 
these partnerships have not yet resulted in improved 
outcomes for youth, women, children and other 
marginal groups in the cocoa sector.
A dominant theme witnessed in all the periods is the 
ability of the government to maintain autonomy and 
control over cocoa revenue. While the liberalisation 
of the value chain was enforced onto Ghana by 
international donor organisations, the government of 
Ghana has, since the 1980s, managed to maintain 
its autonomy and chose a gradual introduction of 
reforms (Ton et al. 2008). Consistent with the literature 
on autonomy and policy ambiguities (Grainger 
and Konteh 2007), policymakers in Ghana rely on 
“ambiguity by deception” to resolve conflicts between 
their interests and the international donors, especially 
concerning liberalisation of the cocoa sector. Despite 
the liberalisation rhetoric by the government, the 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
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state still controls the lucrative cocoa marketing 
sector through COCOBOD, which is responsible for 
controlling LBCs and the export of cocoa. There is 
evidence that possibilities for political settlement 
and rent distribution are the main reasons why the 
COCOBOD has been granted such a monopoly 
over internal cocoa marketing, even in an era of 
liberalisation. An outcome of the political settlement 
is that the two major political parties (NDC and NPP) 
do not follow their own ideologies when it comes 
to managing the cocoa marketing sector. Although 
the NDC is a social democrat party that is said 
to favour state control, while NPP is said to favour 
market liberalisation, the governments of both parties 
have often mandated state institutions, especially 
COCOBOD, to control all lucrative activities in the 
cocoa sector. This substantiates the argument that 
political settlement is an important motivator when it 
comes to making institutional choices.
Meanwhile, the state-supported COCOBOD’s 
monopoly over internal marketing of cocoa and 
cocoa export has been justified by the need to 
ensure the continuous supply of high quality of cocoa 
products. In reality, the state supported agencies 
have historically been used to distribute rents in the 
cocoa sector. While over-taxation of farmers was 
the main mechanism of creating rent in the early 
post-independence era, recent ruling governments 
distribute such rents through the procurement and 
distribution of subsidised inputs and management 
of international donor grants. Subsidies on fertilisers, 
agrochemicals, equipment had become a key political 
tool for ‘buying’ votes and rewarding actors in the 
patronage networks of the ruling government. At the 
same time political elite and their clients continue to 
gain through irregularities in the handling of donor 
grants and awarding of contracts in the cocoa sector. 
The current situation clearly supports the argument 
that financial aid, if not well-coordinated, tend to 
provide the ruling government with resources to 
finance neo-patrimonial networks and hold on to 
power (Teye 2008; Collier and Dollar 1999). However, 
compared with the situation in the early post-colonial 
era (1957–1980), when rent distribution nearly led to a 
collapse of the cocoa industry, the magnitude of rent 
distribution in the contemporary era has been slightly 
restrained by the desire to ensure that the industry does 
not totally collapse. Thus, while political settlement 
has negatively affected the distribution of rent in the 
cocoa sector, recent governments are aware of the 
economic importance of the sector, and are therefore 
committed to ensuring that their political interests do 
not totally destroy the cocoa sector, which is important 
for maintaining power. As a result of the desire to 
use cocoa prices to win political votes, successive 
governments will continue to maintain relatively high 
cocoa prices compared with the situation during the 
military regimes in the 1970s and 1980s. On the other 
hand, even though smallholder farmers are not getting 
substantial profits from the cocoa sector due to low 
prices and land tenure issues, their situation is generally 
better than what it was in the 1970s and 1980s, and 
the situation of many other peasant farmers producing 
non-cash crops.
The study shows that, despite several years of 
government intervention, there are several challenges 
that confront the sector. These include land tenure 
insecurities, labour supply constraints, lack of credit, 
inability to acquire farm inputs, climate change, and 
corruption and neo-patrimonial networks. The sector is 
also characterised by marked social differences, with 
women, youth and migrants in cocoa production being 
poorer than their male counterparts. More recently, the 
emergence of COVID-19 has also negatively affected 
labour supply, access to markets and processing in the 
cocoa sector. The following policy recommendations 
are proposed to deal with some of these challenges. 
First, based on the findings that most smallholder 
cocoa farmers, particularly migrants, are forced 
into undocumented leasehold and sharecropping 
agreements which have several tenure insecurities 
(Callahan 2019; World Bank 2017), we recommend 
that relevant state agencies (e.g. MoFA and Land 
Commission) should design context-specific and 
appropriate land-use policy interventions that deal with 
these land tenure securities. The state agencies should 
also work with NGOS to provide targeted extension 
support services on land acquisition to farmers. 
Furthermore, based on the observation that finding 
hired labour is increasingly difficult and expensive 
for many poor smallholder cocoa farmers, we urge 
policies to encourage the youth to enter and remain 
in agriculture. The current Free Senior High School 
programme should be modelled in such a way that it 
encourages young persons to engage in agriculture. 
Also, given that the price of rural labour has increased 
partly because of the growing pace of rural-urban 
migration of young people (Bymolt et al. 2018), there 
is a need to control rural-urban migration by promoting 
balanced spatial development. A modernised and 
technologically driven agriculture, and agribusinesses 
that offer stable and high paying job opportunities, 
also has high potential to stem rural-urban drift and 
discourage irregular migration of the youth abroad.
Although stakeholders in the cocoa value chain 
are already increasingly concerned about issues of 
climate change and its impact on sustainable cocoa 
production (Bunn et al. 2019; Joerin et al. 2018), efforts 
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to address the environmental challenges are still not 
adequate. Given that expansion of cocoa farms tends 
to lead to deforestation, we call for climate-smart cocoa 
initiatives to increase shade trees on farms. Also, given 
the difficulties that farmers face in accessing loans from 
the banks, we recommend the formation of mutual 
community savings and loans schemes to support 
cocoa farmers. Challenges associated with inadequate 
and late supply of inputs could be addressed through 
better governance of the input supply distribution 
process, and by awarding input supply contracts only 
to companies that have the capacity to deliver. In view 
of the gendered and intergenerational inequalities 
observed in the cocoa sector, we urge policymakers 
to give more attention to gender issues within the 
cocoa industry, as part of efforts at reducing gender 
inequity and empowerment of women. While current 
programmes being implemented by NGOs to enhance 
participation of the youth and women in the cocoa 
value chain are good, there is also the need for 
conscious structural transformative public policies to 
support smallholder women farmers and businesses 
to address societal problems at the community 
level. Additionally, implementing need-based literacy 
classes for women and male farmers, and offering 
recurrent gender sensitive trainings to men could be 
useful for enhancing women’s capacity in dealing 
with existing inequalities. Awareness creation serves 
the dual purpose of directly increasing the agency 
of marginalised individuals, and creating a better 
understanding of structural and everyday inequalities, 
as well as the need for a bottom-up approach.
Corruption, neopatrimonialism, and rent-seeking 
behaviour of crony capitalists and the political elite have, 
historically, affected the performance of the cocoa 
value chain and reduced benefits that could accrue 
to smallholder cocoa farmers. Given these findings, 
we urge international development partners and civil 
society groups to demand greater accountability and 
transparency from political elite and state institutions in 
the cocoa sector.
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Evidence 
For relevant crosscutting hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: 
“If the country is coastal: Production and commercialisation of the crop in question are encouraged by rapidly 
growing urban markets. This may encourage medium- and large-scale farmers to grow the crop alongside 
smallholders. However, incentives for production and commercialisation have been undermined in part by 
unpredictable competition from imports.”
This hypothesis is not supported by the evidence presented. Even though Ghana is a coastal country, urbanisation 
has not influenced the production and commercialisation of cocoa which has historically been largely cultivated 
by smallholders in rural areas. Although a few medium and large-scale farmers cultivate cocoa, about 80 per 
cent of the annual output is produced by smallholders. As cocoa is largely an export commodity, incentives for 
production and commercialisation has not been undermined by competition from imports.
Hypothesis 2:
“If the value chain is a major source of foreign exchange for the country (>25 per cent of merchandise exports): 
National elites seek to use the value chain as an important vehicle for distributing rents to supporters (powerful 
individuals and/or wider voting groups), but the magnitude of rent distribution is restrained by the importance of 
not “killing the goose that lays the golden egg.”
This hypothesis is strongly supported by the evidence. Cocoa is still the most important export crop in Ghana. 
It contributes about 30 per cent of merchandise exports. As discussed, national elites have, since 1957 used 
the cocoa value chain as an important tool for distributing rents to actors in the ruling government’s networks. 
In the early post-colonial era (1957–1980), rent was largely generated and distributed through over-taxation of 
cocoa farmers and offering of employment benefits to clients which resulted in low producer prices offered to 
farmers. The magnitude of rent distribution during this era was very high, nearly resulting in a total collapse of the 
cocoa industry. Since the 1980s when Ghana started implementing economic reforms, political elite have been 
distributing rents through the distribution of donor grants intended to revive the cocoa industry and promote 
rural development. The procurement and distribution of subsidised inputs (e.g. fertilisers) have also been used to 
distribute rents to crony capitalists, especially since 2008. The magnitude of rent distribution in the contemporary 
era has, however, been slightly restrained by the desire to ensure that the industry does not totally collapse.
Hypothesis 3: 
“If production of the crop primarily takes place in sub-national regions with high population density (>200 persons 
/ km2): Production and sale for market are both dominated by smallholder farmers, despite the interest of larger 
players in entering the value chain. Conversely, if production of the crop primarily takes place in sub-national 
regions with low-medium population density (<200 persons / km2): medium- and perhaps also large-scale farms 
have expanded their production and marketing of the crop dramatically over the past decade.” 
This hypothesis is only partially supported by the findings of the study. Production of cocoa largely takes place in 
sub-national regions with low population density. However, there are a few cases where production takes place 
in places with high population density (e.g. Sefwi Area, Eastern Region etc.). In both cases, however, smallholder 
farmers dominate the cultivation of cocoa in Ghana. This is partly due to challenges with the acquisition of 
large tract of lands for large-scale plantations. The marketing segment is however largely controlled by the state 
agencies and a few large-scale enterprises.
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Hypothesis 4: 
“If traditional development partners have engaged actively with the value chain over the past decade: Policy 
interventions have both been designed to stimulate commercialisation in some form or another and to facilitate 
the participation of smallholder farmers in the resulting commercialisation processes. If new development 
partners (e.g. BRICS) have engaged actively with the value chain over the past decade: Policy interventions have 
been designed to stimulate commercialisation in some form or another, but there have been no specific efforts to 
facilitate the participation of smallholder farmers in the resulting commercialisation processes.”
This hypothesis is also partially supported by the findings. Smallholders have historically been active in the 
production segment of the cocoa value chain. While traditional development partners have been promoting 
broader commercialisation and strengthening the participation of smallholders in the cocoa value chain since 
1980, new development partners have also become very active in the coco sector development partnerships 
since 2000. Both the traditional and new development partners are currently involved in the designing and 
implementation of policy interventions to stimulate commercialisation and to facilitate the participation of 
smallholder farmers, especially women and the youth in the cocoa sector.
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